Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument

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One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological sample within a restricted geographical area—European culture since the sixteenth century—one can be certain that man is a recent invention within it. . . . In fact, among all the mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and their order, the . . . only one, that which began a century and a half ago and is now perhaps drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man to appear. And that appearance . . . was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. . . . If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared . . . one can certainly wager that man would be erased.

—Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of The Human Sciences*
The reality in highly indebted countries is grim. Half of Africa’s population—about 300 million people—live without access to basic healthcare or a safe water source. In Tanzania, where 40 percent of the population dies before age 35, the government spends nine times more on foreign debt payments than on healthcare. In 1997, before Hurricane Mitch, Nicaragua spent more than half its revenue on debt payments. Until recently, it has taken countries in structural adjustment programs six or more years to get debt relief. For lenders this seems like common sense—making sure the country has its economic house in order before canceling debts—but the human cost is tremendous. Six years is a child’s entire elementary school education. If governments are forced to cut subsidies for public education and charge fees that make schooling too expensive for the poor, it cheats a whole generation of children.


Definitions of the intellectual are many and diverse. They have, however, one trait in common, which makes them also different from all other definitions: they are all self-definitions. Indeed, their authors are the members of the same rare species they attempt to define. . . . The specifically intellectual form of the operation—self-definition—masks its universal content which is
the reproduction and reinforcement of a given social configuration, and—with it—a given (or claimed) status for the group.

—Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals

What is known as the Gregorian reform was actually an effort of modernization initiated and carried out by the Church from about 1050 until 1215 (the year of the Fourth Lateran Council). The reform first of all established the independence of the Church from secular society. And what better barrier could have been erected between clergy and laity than that of sexuality? Marriage became the property of lay men and women; virginity, celibacy, and/or continence became the property of priests, monks, and nuns. A wall separated the pure from the impure. Impure liquids were banished from the realm of the pure: the clergy was not allowed to spill sperm or blood and not permitted to perpetuate original sin through procreation. But in the realm of the impure the flow was not stanched, only regulated. The Church became a society of bachelors, which imprisoned lay society in marriage.

—Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination

The intellectual’s schizoid character stems from the duality of his social existence; his history is a record of crises of conscience of various kinds, with a variety of origins. In their ideologies the intellectuals cultivate certain particular interests until they have universalized them, then turn about and expose the partiality of those ideologies. . . . They articulate the rules of the social order and the theories which give them sanction, but at the same time it is intellectuals who criticize the existing scheme of things and demand its supersession.

—George Konrad, Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power

Now the highest Father, God the master-builder, . . . took up man . . . and placing him at the midpoint of the world . . . spoke to him as follows: “We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, no gift peculiarly thine, that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine own, pos-
sess as thine own the seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt desire.
A limited nature in other creatures is confined within the laws written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. . . . Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer. Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul’s reason into the higher natures which are divine.”

—Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT THE STRUGGLE OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the “Racism/Ethnicism complex,” on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano 1999, 2000), and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational “colonial difference” on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo 1999, 2000).

The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world’s peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of
earth’s peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South)—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the “New Poor” (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon’s category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called “underdeveloped” areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth’s continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans’s fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim “normal” North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming “normal” human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir,
“nigger” rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man’s overrepresentation of its “descriptive statement” [Bateson 1969] as if it were that of the human itself, then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich 1986]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, “The Sixties.”

The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties’ large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo’s felicitous phrase, a “global design” [Mignolo 2000]) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as “the seduced”), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman’s category of the “repressed” [Bauman 1987]). Both forms of “sanitization” would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties’ vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of “Man.” This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the “immense historical rupture” of the “Big Bang” processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the “rise of the West” and the “subjugation of the rest of us” (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the “rules of the social order” and the theories “which gave them sanction” (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote).
The Janus face of the emergence of Mignolo’s proposed “modernity/coloniality” complementarity is sited here. As also is the answer to the why of the fact that, as Aníbal Quijano insists in his Qué tal Raza! (2000), the “idea of race” would come to be “the most efficient instrument of social domination invented in the last 500 years.” In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the “invention of Man”: that is, by the Renaissance humanists’ epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, “sinful by nature” conception/ “descriptive statement” of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated (Chorover 1979). While, if this redescription was effected by the lay world’s invention of Man as the political subject of the state, in the transsumed and reoccupied place of its earlier matrix identity Christian, the performative enactment of this new “descriptive statement” and its master code of symbolic life and death, as the first secular or “degodded” (if, at the time, still only partly so) mode of being human in the history of the species, was to be effected only on the basis of what Quijano identifies as the “coloniality of power,” Mignolo as the “colonial difference,” and Winant as a huge project demarcating human differences thinkable as a “racial longue durée.” One of the major empirical effects of which would be “the rise of Europe” and its construction of the “world civilization” on the one hand, and, on the other, African enslavement, Latin American conquest, and Asian subjugation.

PART I

The Janus Face of the Invention of “Man”: Laws of Nature and the Thinkability of Natural, rather than Supernatural Causality versus the Dynamics of the Colonizer/Colonized Answer to the Question of Who/What We Are.

This “enormous act of expression/narration” was paradoxical. It was to be implemented by the West and by its intellectuals as indeed a “Big Bang” process by which it/they were to initiate the first gradual de-supernaturalizing
of our modes of being human, by means of its/their re-invention of the theocentric “descriptive statement” Christian as that of Man in two forms. The first was from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century; the second from then on until today, thereby making possible both the conceptualizability of natural causality, and of nature as an autonomously functioning force in its own right governed by its own laws (i.e., \textit{cursus solitus naturae}) (Hubner 1983; Blumenberg 1983; Hallyn 1990), with this, in turn, making possible the cognitively emancipatory rise and gradual development of the physical sciences (in the wake of the invention of Man1), and then of the biological sciences (in the wake of the nineteenth century invention of Man2). These were to be processes made possible only on the basis of the dynamics of a colonizer/colonized relation that the West was to discursively constitute and empirically institutionalize on the islands of the Caribbean and, later, on the mainlands of the Americas.

This seeing that if, as Quijano rightly insists, race—unlike gender (which has a biogenetically determined anatomical differential correlate onto which each culture’s system of gendered oppositions can be anchored)—is a purely invented construct that has no such correlate (Quijano 2000), it was this construct that would enable the now globally expanding West to replace the earlier mortal/immortal, natural/supernatural, human/the ancestors, the gods/God distinction as the one on whose basis all human groups had millennially “grounded” their descriptive statement/prescriptive statements of what it is to be human, and to reground its secularizing own on a newly projected human/subhuman distinction instead. That is, on Quijano’s “Racism/Ethnicism” complex, Winant’s “race concept,” Mignolo’s “colonial difference,” redefined in the terms of the Spanish state’s theoretical construct of a “by-nature difference” between Spaniards and the indigenous peoples of the Americas (Padgen 1982): a difference defined in Ginés de Sepúlveda’s sixteenth-century terms as almost a difference between “monkeys and men,” homunculi and true humans. “Race” was therefore to be, in effect, the non-supernatural but no less extrahuman ground (in the reoccupied place of the traditional ancestors/gods, God, ground) of the answer that the secularizing West would now give to the Heideggerian question as to the who, and the what we are.
In his 1999 Coloniality Working Group conference presentation, Walter Mignolo perceptively identified one of the consequences of the “Big Bang” initiation of the “colonial difference” as that of the fact that, “in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world system sustainable knowledge . . . disregarded Amerindian ways of knowing and knowledge production that were reduced to curious practices of strange people and, in another domain were demonized.” However, the anthropologist Jacob Pandian (1985) enables us to see that this epistemological “disregard” was itself part of an even more central imperative—that of the sustainability of the new mode of being human, of its epochal redescription as, primarily, that of the political subject of the state Man in the transumed and reoccupied place of Latin-Christian Europe’s founding matrix description, Christian, which had defined the human as primarily the religious subject of the Church. While, if this new descriptive statement (one that was to gradually privatize as well as harness the matrix Christian identity to the realizing of the modern state’s own secular goals of imperial territorial expansion) was also to be effected on the basis of a parallel series of discursive and institutional inventions, there was one that was to be as novel as it was to be central. This, as Pandian documents, was to be that of the West’s transformation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas/the Caribbean (culturally classified as Indians, indios/indias), together with the population group of the enslaved peoples of Africa, transported across the Atlantic (classified as Negroes, negros/negras) into the physical referents of its reinvention of medieval Europe’s Untrue Christian Other to its normative True Christian Self, as that of the Human Other to its new “descriptive statement” of the ostensibly only normal human, Man.

In his seminal book, *Anthropology and the Western Tradition: Towards an Authentic Anthropology* (1985), Jacob Pandian enables us to see that within the terms of the Judeo-Christian religious creed (within the terms, therefore, of its variant of the “formulation of a general order of existence,” correlated “postulate of a significant ill,” and therefore proposed behavior-motivating “cure” or “plan of salvation” that is defining of all religions [Girardot 1988]), the physical referents of the conception of the Untrue Other to the True Christian Self had been the categories of peoples defined in reli-
gious terminology as heretics, or as Enemies-of-Christ infidels and pagan-idolaters (with Jews serving as the boundary-transgressive “name of what is evil” figures, stigmatized as Christ-killing deicides). In the wake of the West’s reinvention of its True Christian Self in the transumed terms of the Rational Self of Man, however, it was to be the peoples of the militarily expropriated New World territories (i.e., Indians), as well as the enslaved peoples of Black Africa (i.e., Negroes), that were made to reoccupy the matrix slot of Otherness—to be made into the physical referent of the idea of the irrational/subrational Human Other, to this first degoded (if still hybridly religio-secular) “descriptive statement” of the human in history, as the descriptive statement that would be foundational to modernity.

So that rather than “sustainable knowledge” merely disregarding the “other ways of knowing” of the Amerindian peoples, as Mignolo contends, Pandian proposes instead that it was to be the discourses of this knowledge, including centrally those of anthropology, that would function to construct all the non-Europeans that encountered (including those whose lands its settlers expropriated and those whom they enslaved or enserfed) as the physical referent of, in the first phase, its irrational or subrational Human Other to its new “descriptive statement” of Man as a political subject. While the “Indians” were portrayed as the very acme of the savage, irrational Other, the “Negroes” were assimilated to the former’s category, represented as its most extreme form and as the ostensible missing link between rational humans and irrational animals. However, in the wake of the West’s second wave of imperial expansion, pari passu with its reinvention of in Man now purely biologized terms, it was to be the peoples of Black African descent who would be constructed as the ultimate referent of the “racially inferior” Human Other, with the range of other colonized dark-skinned peoples, all classified as “natives,” now being assimilated to its category—all of these as the ostensible embodiment of the non-evolved backward Others—if to varying degrees and, as such, the negation of the generic “normal humanness,” ostensibly expressed by and embodied in the peoples of the West. Nevertheless, if the range of Native Others were now to be classified, as Pandian further explains, in the terms of the multiple mythologies, of the savage Other, the fossil Other, the abnormal Other, the timeless ethnographic
Other, the most salient of all these was to be that of the mythology of the Black Other of sub-Saharan Africans (and their Diaspora descendants). It is this population group who would come to be made, several centuries on, into an indispensable function of the enacting of our present Darwinian “dysselected by Evolution until proven otherwise” descriptive statement of the human on the biocentric model of a natural organism. With this population group’s systemic stigmatization, social inferiorization, and dynamically produced material deprivation thereby serving both to “verify” the overrepresentation of Man as if it were the human, and to legitimate the subordination of the world and well-being of the latter to those of the former. All of this was done in a lawlike manner through the systemic stigmatization of the Earth in terms of its being made of a “vile and base matter,” a matter ontologically different from that which attested to the perfection of the heavens, and thereby (as such) divinely condemned to be fixed and unmoving at the center of the universe as its dregs because the abode of a post-Adamic “fallen” mankind had been an indispensable function of the “verifying” of medieval Latin-Christian Europe’s then theocentric descriptive statement of human as “sinful by nature.” In this way, the descriptive statement on which the hegemony of the world of the Church over the lay world was legitimated (Chorover 1979).

Gregory Bateson and Frantz Fanon, thinking and writing during the upheaval of the anticolonial/social-protest movements of the sixties, were both to put forward new conceptions of the human outside the terms of our present ethnoclass conception that define it on the model of a natural organism, as these terms are elaborated by the disciplinary paradigms and overall organization of knowledge of our present episteme (Foucault 1973). In an essay entitled “Conscious Purpose vs. Nature,” published in 1969, Bateson proposed that in the same way as the “physiology” and “neurology” of the human individual function in order to conserve the body and all the body’s physical characteristics—thereby serving as an overall system that conserves descriptive statements about the human as far as his/her body is concerned—so a correlated process can be seen to be at work at the level of the psyche or the soul. To put it another way, not only is the descriptive statement of the psyche/soul determinant of the kind of higher-level learning
that must take place, seeing that the indispensable function of each such system of learning must be, imperatively, to conserve that descriptive statement, but it is also determinant of the overall range of acquired know-how that is produced by the interactions of the wider society in which each individual finds itself—and as a society whose overall descriptive statement will necessarily be of the same general order as that of the individual, at the level of the psyche/soul. All such learning, whether at the microlevel of the individual or at the macrolevel of the society, must therefore function within the terms of what Foucault has identified as a specific “regime” and/or “politics of truth” (Foucault 1980, 1981).

Fanon had then gone on to analyze the systemically negative representation of the Negro and of his African past that defined the curriculum of the French colonial school system of the Caribbean island of Martinique in which he had grown up (one in which, as he also notes, no Black counter-voice had been allowed to exist), in order to reveal why, as a result of the structures of Bateson’s system of learning designed to preserve the status quo, the Antillean Negro had indeed been socialized to be normally anti-Negro. Nor, the Argument proposes, was there anything arbitrary about this deliberate blocking out or disregard of a “Black” voice, of a positive Black self-conception. Rather this “blocking out” of a Black counter-voice was, and is itself defining of the way in which being human, in the terms of our present ethnoclass mode of sociogeny, dictates that Self, Other, and World should be represented and known; a lay counter-voice could no more have normally existed within the terms of the mode of sociogeny of medieval Latin-Christian Europe. In consequence, because it is this premise that underlies the interlinked nature of what I have defined (on the basis of Quijano’s founding concept of the coloniality of power) as the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, with the logical inference that one cannot “unsettle” the “coloniality of power” without a redescriptions of the human outside the terms of our present descriptive statement of the human, Man, and its over-representation (outside the terms of the “natural organism” answer that we give to the question of the who and the what we are), the Argument will first link this premise to a fundamental thesis developed by Nicholas Humphrey in his book *A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness,*
published in 1992. It will then link both to the sixteenth-century dispute between Bartolomé de Las Casas, the missionary priest, on the one hand, and the humanist royal historian and apologist for the Spanish settlers of then Santo Domingo, Ginés de Sepúlveda, on the other—as a dispute that it will define as one between two descriptive statements of the human: one for which the expansion of the Spanish state was envisaged as a function of the Christian evangelizing mission, the Other for which the latter mission was seen as a function of the imperial expansion of the state; a dispute, then, between the theocentric conception of the human, Christian, and the new humanist and ratiocentric conception of the human, Man2 (i.e., as homo politicus, or the political subject of the state).

Here, the Argument, basing itself on Fanon’s and Bateson’s redefinition of the human, proposes that the adaptive truth-for terms in which each purely organic species must know the world is no less true in our human case. That therefore, our varying ontogeny/sociogeny modes of being human, as inscribed in the terms of each culture’s descriptive statement, will necessarily give rise to their varying respective modalities of adaptive truths-for, or epistemes, up to and including our contemporary own. Further, that given the biocentric descriptive statement that is instituting of our present mode of sociogeny, the way we at present normatively know Self, Other, and social World is no less adaptively true as the condition of the continued production and reproduction of such a genre of being human and of its order as, before the revolution initiated by the Renaissance humanists, and given the then theocentric descriptive statement that had been instituting of the mode of sociogeny of medieval Latin-Christian Europe, its subjects had normatively known Self, Other, as well as their social, physical, and organic worlds, in the adaptively true terms needed for the production and reproduction not only of their then supernaturally legitimated genre of being human, but as well for that of the hierarchical social structures in whose intersubjective field that genre of the human could have alone realized itself.

And it is with the production and reproduction of the latter (i.e., the social world) that a crucial difference needs to be identified in our human case. This was the difference identified by C. P. Snow when he described our present order of knowledge as one defined by a Two Culture divide between
the natural sciences, on the one hand (whose domains comprise the physical cosmos, as well as that of all biological life), and the disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities on the other (Snow 1993). And although there has been some attempt recently to rebut the hypothesis of this divide, centrally among these the Gulbenkian Report on the social sciences prepared by a team of scholars headed by Immanuel Wallerstein and Valentin Mudimbe (1994), the fact remains that while the natural sciences can explain and predict, to a large extent, the behaviors of these nonhuman worlds, the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities still remain unable to explain and predict the parameters of the ensemble of collective behaviors that are instituting of our contemporary world—to explain, therefore, the why not only of the large-scale inequalities, but also of the overall Janus-faced effects of large-scale human emancipation yoked to the no less large-scale human degradation and immiseration to which these behaviors collectively lead. These behaviors, whether oriented by the residual metaphysics of fertility/reproduction of the agrarian age in the poorer parts of the world, or by the metaphysics of productivity and profitability of our techno-industrial one in the rich enclaves—with the one impelling the dynamics of overpopulation, and the other that of overconsumption—now collectively threaten the planetary environment of our human-species habitat.

The Argument proposes, in this context, that the still unbreachable divide between the “Two Cultures”—a divide that had been briefly challenged by the range of anticolonial as well as the social cum intellectual movements of the sixties, before these movements were re-coopted—lies in the fact that our own disciplines (as literary scholars and social scientists whose domain is our sociohuman world) must still continue to function, as all human orders of knowledge have done from our origin on the continent of Africa until today, as a language-capacitated form of life, to ensure that we continue to know our present order of social reality, and rigorously so, in the adaptive “truth-for” terms needed to conserve our present descriptive statement. That is, as one that defines us biocentrically on the model of a natural organism, with this a priori definition serving to orient and motivate the individual and collective behaviors by means of which our contemporary Western world-system or civilization, together with its nation-state sub-
units, are stably produced and reproduced. This at the same time as it ensures that we, as Western and westernized intellectuals, continue to articulate, in however radically oppositional a manner, the rules of the social order and its sanctioned theories (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979).

Recent and still ongoing scholarship on archaeo-astronomy has shown that all human orders—from the smallest society of nomadic hunter-gatherers, such as the San people of the Kalahari, to the large-scale societies of Egypt, China, the Greeks, and the Romans—have mapped their “descriptive statements” or governing master codes on the heavens, on their stable periodicities and regular recurring movements (Krupp 1997). Because, in doing so, they had thereby mapped their specific criterion of being human, of what it was “to be a good man and woman of one’s kind” (Davis 1992), onto the physical cosmos, thereby absolutizing each such criterion; and with this enabling them to be experienced by each order’s subjects as if they had been supernaturally (and, as such, extrahumanly) determined criteria, their respective truths had necessarily come to function as an “objective set of facts” for the people of that society—seeing that such truths were now the indispensable condition of their existence as such a society, as such people, as such a mode of being human. These truths had therefore both commanded obedience and necessitated the individual and collective behaviors by means of which each such order and its mode of being human were brought into existence, produced, and stably reproduced. This, therefore, meant that all such knowledges of the physical cosmos, all such astronomies, all such geographies, whatever the vast range of human needs that they had successfully met, the range of behaviors they had made possible—indeed, however sophisticated and complex the calculations that they had enabled to be made of the movements of the heavens (as in the case of Egypt and China)—had still remained adaptive truths-for and, as such, ethno-astronomies, ethno-geographies.

This was no less the case with respect to the long tradition of Greek/Hellenistic astronomy, which a medieval Judeo-Christian Europe would have inherited. Since, in spite of the great advances in mathematical astronomy to which its fundamental Platonic postulate (that of an eternal, “divinized” cosmos as contrasted with the Earth, which was not only subject to change
and corruption, but was fixed and unmoving at the center) has led a long line of astronomers to struggle to “save the phenomena” (i.e., to reconcile their measurements of the movements of the heavens with this premise), Greek astronomy was to remain an ethno-astronomy. One, that is, in which the moral/political laws of the Greek polis had been projected upon the physical cosmos, enabling them to serve as “objective truth” in Feyerabend’s (1987) sense of the term, and therefore as, in my own terms, adaptive truth-for the Greeks. With the consequence that their projected premise of a value distinction and principle of ontological distinction between heaven and earth had functioned to analogically replicate and absolutize the central order-organizing principle and genre-of-the-human distinction at the level of the sociopolitical order, between the non-dependent masters who were Greek-born citizens and their totally dependent slaves classified as barbarian Others. With this value distinction (sociogenic principle or master code of symbolic life/death) then being replicated at the level of the intra-Greek society, in gendered terms (correlatedly), as between males, who were citizens, and women, who were their dependents.

In a 1987 interview, the theoretical physicist David Bohm explained why the rise of the physical sciences would have been impossible in ancient Greece, given the role that the physical cosmos had been made to play in stabilizing and legitimating the structures/hierarchies and role allocations of its social order. If each society, Bohm pointed out, bases itself on a general notion of the world that always contains within it “a specific idea of order,” for the ancient Greeks, this idea of order had been projected as that of an “increasing perfection from the earth to the heavens.” In consequence, in order for modern physics (which is based on the “idea of successive positions of bodies of matter and the constraints of forces that act on these bodies”) to be developed, the “order of perfection investigated by the ancient Greeks” had to become irrelevant. In other words, for such an astronomy and physics to be developed, the society that made it possible would have to be one that no longer had the need to map its ordering principle onto the physical cosmos, as the Greeks and all other human societies had done. The same goes for the need to retain the Greek premise of an ontological difference of substance between the celestial realm of perfection (the realm of
true knowledge) and the imperfect realm of the terrestrial (the realm of doxa, of mere opinion).

This was not a mutation that could be easily effected. In his recent book *The Enigma of the Gift* (1999), Maurice Godelier reveals an added and even more powerful dimension as to why the mutation by which humans would cease to map the “idea of order” onto the lawlike regularities of physical nature would not be easily come by. This would come to be effected only in the wake of the Renaissance humanists’ initiation of the processes that would lead to the degodding/de-supernaturalizing of our modes of being human on the basis of their invention of Man in the reoccupied place of their earlier matrix theocentric identity, Christian.

Although, Godelier writes, as human beings who live in society, and who must also produce society in order to live, we have hitherto always done so by producing, at the same time, the mechanisms by means of which we have been able to invert cause and effect, allowing us to repress the recognition of our collective production of our modes of social reality (and with it, the Argument proposes, the recognition also of the self-inscripted, auto-instituted nature of our genres/modes of being human). Central to these mechanisms was the one by which we projected our own authorship of our societies onto the ostensible extrahuman agency of supernatural Imaginary Beings (Godelier 1999). This imperative has been total in the case of all human orders (even where in the case of our now purely secular order, the extrahuman agency on which our authorship is now projected is no longer supernatural, but rather that of Evolution/Natural Selection together with its imagined entity of “Race”). As if, in our contemporary case, Evolution, which pre-adapted us by means of the co-evolution of language and the brain to self-inscript and auto-institute our modes of being human, and to thereby artificially program our own behaviors—doing so, as the biologist James Danielli pointed out in a 1980 essay, by means of the discourses of religion, as well as of the secular ones that have now taken their place—still continued to program our hybrid ontogeny/sociogeny behaviors by means of unmediated genetic programs. Rather than, as Danielli further argued, all such behaviors being lawlikely induced by discursively instituted programs whose good/evil formulations function to activate the biochemical
reward/punishment mechanism of the brain—as a mechanism that, while common to all species, functions in the case of humans in terms specific to each such narratively inscribed and discursively elaborated descriptive statement and, thereby, to its mode of the “I” and correlated symbolically/altruistically bonded mode of the eusocial “we” (Danielli 1980).

If, as David Bohm pointed out, the Greeks’ “idea of order” had been mapped upon degrees of perfection, projected upon the physical cosmos as degrees of rational perfection extending from the apex of the heavens' degrees to the nonhomogenous nadir of the earth’s—with the rise, in the wake of the collapse of the Roman Empire, of a now Judeo-Christian Europe, while the classical Greco-Roman (i.e., Ptolemaic) astronomy that had given expression to the Greek idea of order was to be carried over—it was to be Christianized within the terms of Judeo-Christianity’s new “descriptive statement” of the human, based on its master code of the “Redeemed Spirit” (as actualized in the celibate clergy) and the “Fallen Flesh” enslaved to the negative legacy of Adamic Original Sin, as actualized by laymen and women. Hence the logic by which medieval Latin-Christian Europe’s “notion of the world” and “idea of order” would become one of degrees of spiritual perfection, at the same time as it would remain mapped onto the same “space of Otherness” principle of nonhomogeneity (Godzich 1986). With the result that on the basis of this projection, the medieval Latin-Christian subject’s sensory perception of a motionless earth would have “verified” for them not only the postulate of mankind’s justly condemned enslavement to the negative Adamic legacy, but, even more centrally, the “sinful by nature” descriptive statement of the human in whose terms they both experienced themselves as Christians, being thereby behaviorally impelled to seek redemption from their enslavement through the sacraments of the Church, as well as by adhering to its prohibitions, and to thereby strive to attain to its otherworldly goal—that of Divine Election for eternal salvation in the Augustinian civitas dei (the city of God).

Central to Winant’s “immense historical rupture,” therefore, was the conceptual break made with the Greco-Roman cum Judeo-Christian premise of a nonhomogeneity of substance, and thereby of an ontological distinction between the supralunar and the sublunar, heaven and earth, as the break
that was to make possible the rise of a nonadaptive, and therefore natural-
scientific, mode of cognition with respect to the “objective set of facts” of the
physical level of reality: with respect to what was happening “out there.” The
fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese (to and around Africa, then to
the East), as well as Columbus’s voyages across an until-then held to be (by
Western Europeans) non-navigable Atlantic Ocean (since both of these
areas, Black Africa and the Americas, had been held to be uninhabitable, the
one because too hot, the other because under water, with both being outside
God’s providential Grace) were themselves expressions of the same overall
process of self-transformation. This as the process that, internal to late-
medieval Latin-Christian Europe, was to underpin the rise of the modern
political city and monarchical states of Europe, and that (together with an
ongoing commercial revolution) were to effectively displace the theologi-
cally absolute hegemony of the Church, together with that of its celibate
clergy, over the lay or secular world, replacing it with that of their (i.e. the
monarchical states’) politically absolute own. The new conceptual ground of
this reversal had, however, been made possible only on the basis of the intel-
lectual revolution of Renaissance humanists—a revolution that, while allied
to the Reform movement of Christian humanism, was mounted in large part
from the counter-perspective of the lay intelligentsia. From the viewpoint,
therefore, of the category whose members had until then been compelled to
think and work within the very theocentric paradigms that legitimated the
dominance of the post-Gregorian Reform Church and its celibate clergy (the
name clergy means, in Greek, the chosen) over the lay world—as these par-
adigms had been elaborated in the context of the then hegemonic Scholastic
order of knowledge of medieval Europe.

This theological condemnation of the “natural man” of the laity had
become even more intensified by medieval Scholasticism’s reconception of
the human in Aristotelian Unmoved/Mover terms. Its Omnipotent God had
created the world for the sake of His Own Glory, thereby creating mankind
only contingently and without any consideration for its own sake (propter
nos homines/for our human sake), had left it, in the wake of the Adamic Fall
and its subsequent enslavement to the Fallen Flesh, without any hope of
being able to have any valid knowledge of reality except through the media-
tion of the very paradigms that excluded any such hope. Given that it was precisely these theologically absolute paradigms that, by circularly verifying the “sinful by nature” cognitive incapacity of fallen mankind, served at the same time to validate both the hegemony of the Church and of the celibate clergy over the lay world, including the state, as well as the hegemony of the supratemporal perspective of the Church (based on its represented access to Divine Eternal Truth) over any knowledge generated from the local, temporal, and this-worldly perspective of a lay world ostensibly entrapped in the fallen time of the secular realm, this thereby subjected mankind to the instability and chaos of the capricious whims of Fortune (Pocock 1989).

The lay intelligentsia of medieval Europe had, therefore, found themselves in a situation in whose context, in order to be learned and accomplished scholars, they had had to be accomplices in the production of a “politics of truth” that subordinated their own lay world and its perspective on reality to that of the Church and of the clergy. Accomplices also in the continued theoretical elaboration of a theocentric descriptive statement of the human, in whose terms they were always already the embodied bearers of its postulate of “significant ill”—that of enslavement to Original Sin—an “ill” curable or redeemable only through the mediation of the Church and the clergy, and circularly, through that of the theologically absolute paradigms that verified the hegemony of the latter.

The manifesto (put forward from the perspective of the laity) that was to make possible the rupture in whose terms the Copernican Revolution and the new epoch that would become that of the modern world were to be made possible was that of the fifteenth-century treatise by the Italian humanist Pico della Mirandola (1463‒1494) entitled Oration on the Dignity of Man. In this treatise, Pico rewrote the Judeo-Christian origin narrative of Genesis. Adam, rather than having been placed in the Garden of Eden, then having fallen, then having been expelled with Eve from the garden by God, is shown by Pico to have not fallen at all. Instead, he had come into existence when God, having completed his Creation and wanting someone to admire His works, had created Man on a model unique to him, then placed him at the center/midpoint of the hierarchy of this creation, commanding him to “make of himself” what he willed to be—to decide for himself whether to fall
to the level of the beasts by giving into his passions, or, through the use of his reason, to rise to the level of the angels (See Pico's guide-quote). It was therefore to be on the basis of this new conception, and of its related civic-humanist reformulation, that Man was to be invented in its first form as the rational political subject of the state, as one who displayed his reason by primarily adhering to the laws of the state—rather than, as before, in seeking to redeem himself from enslavement to Original Sin by primarily adhering to the prohibitions of the Church.

Two strategies were made use of in order to effect this epochal degodding (if, at first, only in hybridly religio-secular terms) of the “descriptive statement” in whose terms humans inscript and institute themselves/ourselves as this or that genre of being human. The strategy was that of a return: the return by the humanists to Greco-Roman thought, to (in the case of Pico) the Jewish mystical tradition of the Kabbalah, as well as to the even earlier Egyptian thought as transmitted through these latter, in order to find both a space outside the terms of the medieval order’s “descriptive statement” and an alternative model on which to reinvent the matrix optimally. Redeemed-in-the-Spirit Self of the Christian, the “subject of the church,” as that of the Rational Self of Man as political subject of the state. While it was the revalorization of natural man that was implicit in this overall return to the Greco-Roman and other pre-Christian thought, and models by Renaissance humanists such as Ficino and Pico, as Fernand Hallyn (1990) has proposed, that was to make possible Copernicus’s intellectual challenge to the ontological distinction between the supralunar and sublunar realms of the cosmos: to its foundational premise of a nonhomogeneity of substance between them.

Why was this the case? Within the terms of the medieval order’s theocentric conception of the relation between a totally Omnipotent God and contingently created humans, the latter could not attempt to gain valid knowledge of physical reality by basing him/herself on the regularity of its laws of functioning. Seeing that God, as an absolute and unbound God, could arbitrarily intervene in the accustomed course of nature (cursus solitus naturae) in order to alter its processes of functioning, by means of miracles, at any time He wished to do so. It was therefore to be, as Hallyn
proposes, the humanists’ revalorized conception of a more egalitarian relation between natural man and a Christian God, reconceived as a Caring Father who had created the universe specifically for man’s sake (propter nos homines, for our human sake), that provided the counter-ground for the Copernican rupture with the orthodox Christianized astronomy that had been inherited from the Greeks. It was the new premise that God had created the world/universe for mankind’s sake, as a premise that ensured that He would have had to make it according to rational, nonarbitrary rules that could be knowable by the beings that He had made it for, that would lead to Copernicus’s declaration (against the epistemological resignation of Ptolemaic astronomy, which said that such knowledge was not available for mere mortals) that since the universe had been made for our sake by the best and wisest of master craftsmen, it had to be knowable (see Copernicus guide-quote).

In his book The Medieval Imagination, Jacques Le Goff analyzes the way in which the medieval order of Latin-Christian Europe had organized itself about a value principle or master code that had been actualized in the empirical relation between the celibate category of the clergy (as the embodiment of the Spirit, and the noncelibate category of the laity (as the embodiment of the Fallen Flesh). This Spirit/Flesh code had then been projected onto the physical cosmos, precisely onto the represented nonhomogeneity of substance between the spiritual perfection of the heavens (whose supralunar bodies were imagined to move in harmonious and perfectly circular motions) as opposed to the sublunar realm of Earth, which, as the abode of a post-Adamic fallen mankind, had to be at the center of the universe as its dregs—and, in addition, to be not only nonmoving as it is sensed by us to be, but to be so because divinely condemned to be nonmoving in the wake of the Fall. However, it was not only the Earth that had to be known in these adaptive truth-for terms, within the conceptual framework of the Christian-Ptolemaic astronomy of the time. The geography of the earth had also had to be known in parallel Spirit/Flesh terms as being divided up between, on the one hand, its temperate regions centered on Jerusalem—regions that, because held up above the element of water by God’s Providential Grace, were habitable—and, on the other, those realms that, because outside this
Grace, had to be uninhabitable. Before the fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese and Columbus, which disproved this premise of the nonhomogeneity of the earth’s geography, the Torrid Zone beyond the bulge of Cape Bojador on the upper coast of Africa had therefore had to be known as too hot for habitation, while the Western hemisphere had had to be known as being devoid of land, seeing that all land there had to remain, in the framework of Christian Aristotelian physics, submerged in its “natural place” under water, since ostensibly not held “unnaturally” above the water by Divine Grace.

This series of symbolically coded Spirit/Flesh representations mapped upon the “space of Otherness” of the physical cosmos had not only functioned to absolutize the theocentric descriptive statement of the human, its master code of symbolic life (the Spirit) and death (the Flesh), together with that statement’s overall explanatory thesis of supernatural causation. It had also served to absolutize “a general order of existence,” together with its “postulate of significant ill,” whose mode of affliction then logically calls for the particular “plan of salvation” or redemptive cure able to cure the specific “ill” that threatened all the subjects of the order, in order to redeem them from its threat of nihilation/negation that is common to all religions (Girardot 1988). Now in specific Judeo-Christian formulation, the postulate of “significant ill” had, of course, been that of mankind’s enslavement to Original Sin, with his/her fallen state placing him/her outside God’s Grace, except when redeemed from this “ill” by the sacrament of baptism as administered by the clergy. While this behavior-motivating schema had itself also been anchored on the Spirit/Flesh, inside/outside God’s Grace, ill/cure system of symbolic representations attached to the represented supra/sublunar nonhomogeneity of substance of the physical cosmos, as well as to the habitable/uninhabitable geography of the earth.

Here the Argument identifies Girardot’s schemas as ones that also function beyond the limits of original religious modalities, seeing them instead in the terms of Danielli’s hypothesis as forms of the central, behavior-motivating/-demotivating, discursive, good/evil postulates, able to activate the biochemical reward and punishment mechanism—and, therefore, as the central “machinery of programming” that is common to all human orders,
whether religious or secular. In consequence, whether religious or secular, all such schemas/programs and their formulations of “a general order of existence” also function to inscribe the specific “descriptive statement” of the human that is enacting of the ontogeny/sociogeny, nature-culture mode of being human, for whom the specific ensemble of motivated behaviors will be adaptively advantageous. In this conceptual framework it can therefore be recognized that it was in the context of the humanists’ redescribing of the Christian definition of the human—in new, revalorizing, and (so to speak) propter nos homines and/or Man-centric terms—that the series of fifteenth-century voyages on whose basis the West began its global expansion voyages (one of which proved that the earth was homogeneously habitable by humans, seeing that the Torrid Zone was indeed inhabited, as was that of the land of the Western hemisphere that turned out to be above water), together with Copernicus’s new astronomy (which proposed that the earth also moved about the Sun, projected as the center, and was therefore of the same substance as, homogeneous with, the heavenly bodies), were to initiate the rupture that would lead to the rise of the physical sciences. Thereby, to a new order of cognition in which “the objective set of facts” of the physical level of reality was now to be gradually freed from having to be known in the adaptive terms of a truth-for specific to each order, as they had been millenially—to be known as they were and are “out there.”

What needs to be emphasized here is, firstly, that the two orthodox presuppositions that were now to be swept away—that of the nonhomogeneity of the geography of the earth and that of the nonhomogeneity of the earth and the heavens—had been ones indispensable to the conservation of the medieval order’s theocentric descriptive statement of the human. Secondly, it had been the reinvention by the lay humanists of the Renaissance of the matrix identity Christian in terms of the new descriptive statement of Man as political subject, allied to the historical rise and expansion of the modern state (for whom, eventually, these earlier orthodox presuppositions, their truth-fors, were expendable, because no longer of any adaptive advantage to its own instituting as such a mode of being human), that had made the sweeping away of the earlier unquestioned principles of nonhomogeneity possible.
This sweeping away led a later Isaac Newton to exult that, because it had now been shown that all parts of the universe were made of the same forces, of the same matter, one could now be able to extrapolate from the bodies nearest to us, and on the analogy of nature always consonant with itself, what the bodies furthest from us had necessarily to be (Funkenstein 1986).

To sum up: this means that the epochal rupture that was set in motion by Western intellectuals, by means of which human knowledge of the physical cosmos would be freed from having to be known in the adaptive truth-for terms that had been hitherto indispensable to the instituting of all human orders and their respective modes/genres of being human—the rupture that was to lead to the gradual development of the physical sciences—had been made possible only by the no less epochal reinvention of Western Europe’s matrix Judeo-Christian genre of the human, in its first secularizing if still hybridly religio-secular terms as Man as the Rational Self and political subject of the state, in the reoccupied place of the True Christian Self, or mode of sociogeny, of Latin-Christian Europe; by the reinvention also of the secular entity of the West in the reoccupied place of the latter, with this reinvention being based on the model of Virgil’s Roman imperial epic.

This takes us back to the negative aspect of the dialectical process of culture-historical transformation by which the West was to initiate the first phase of the degodding of its descriptive statement of the human, thereby also initiating the processes that were to lead to the development of the new order of nonadaptive cognition that is the natural sciences. Since it was to be in the specific terms of this reinvention—one in which while, as Christians, the peoples of the West would see themselves as one religious genre of the human, even where they were to be convinced that theirs was the only true religion, and indeed, as Lyotard points out, were unable to conceive of an Other to what they called God—as Man, they would now not only come to overrepresent their conception of the human (by means of a sustained rhetorical strategy based on the topos of iconicity [Valesio 1980]) as the human, thereby coming to invent, label, and institutionalize the indigenous peoples of the Americas as well as the transported enslaved Black Africans as the physical referent of the projected irrational/subrational
Human Other to its civic-humanist, rational self-conception. The West would therefore remain unable, from then on, to conceive of an Other to what it calls human—an Other, therefore, to its correlated postulates of power, truth, freedom. All other modes of being human would instead have to be seen not as the alternative modes of being human that they are “out there,” but adaptively, as the lack of the West’s ontologically absolute self-description. This at the same time as its genuine difference from all others (i.e., its secularizing reinvention of its matrix religious identity from the Renaissance onwards as that of Man in two forms—one ratiocentric and still hybridly religio-secular, the other purely secular and biocentric) would remain overseen, even non-theorizable within the acultural premise on whose basis it had effected the reinvention of its matrix Christian genre or theological “descriptive statement” of the human.

This central oversight would then enable both Western and westernized intellectuals to systemically repress what Geertz has identified as the “fugitive truth” of its own “local culturality” (Geertz 1983)—of, in Bruno Latour’s terms, its specific “constitution with a capital C,” or cultural constitution that underlies and charters our present order, as the parallel constitutions of all other human orders that Western anthropologists have brilliantly elucidated underlie and charter all other human orders (Latour 1991)—doing so according to the same hybrid nature-culture, ontogeny/sociogeny laws or rules. With this systemic repression ensuring that we oversee (thereby failing to recognize) the culture and class-specific relativity of our present mode of being human: Man in the second, transumed, and now purely biocentric and homo oeconomicus form of that first invention that was to lead to Winant’s “immense historical rupture,” to Quijano’s “Racism/Ethnicism” complex, and to Mignolo’s modernity/coloniality complementarity.

What were the specific terms of that first reinvention? Of its overrepresentation? Why were these terms to lie at the basis of the Las Casas/Sepúlveda dispute, whose empirical outcome—in favor of the latter’s humanist arguments as opposed to Las Casas’s still theologically grounded ones—was to provide the legitimated “ground” for what was to become the colonizer (both the metropolitan imperialists and their settler enforcers) vs. colonized relation (both Indians and Negroes, on the one hand, and the set-
tlers as criollos subjugated to the metropolitan peninsulares—whether those of Spain, England, or France—on the other).

PART I
The Las Casas/Sepúlveda Dispute and the Paradox of the Humanists’ Invention/Overrepresentation of “Man”: On the Coloniality of Secular Being, the Instituting of Human Others.

The suggestion that the Indians might be slaves by nature—a suggestion which claimed to answer questions concerning both their political and their legal status—was first advanced as a solution to a political dilemma: by what right had the crown of Castile occupied and enslaved the inhabitants of territories to which it could make no prior claims based on history? ... [John Mair’s text adopted from Aristotle’s Politics] was immediately recognized by some Spaniards as offering a final solution to their problem. Mair had, in effect, established that the Christians’ claims to sovereignty over certain pagans could be said to rest on the nature of the people being conquered, instead of on the supposed juridical rights of the conquerors. He thus avoided the inevitable and alarming deduction to be drawn from an application of these arguments: namely that the Spaniards had no right whatsoever to be in America.

—Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indians and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology

Leopoldo is asked to compare the Spaniards with the Indians, “who in prudence, wisdom (ingenium), every virtue and humanity are as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults, women are to men, the savage and ferocious [man] to the gentle, the grossly intemperate to the continent and temperate and finally, I shall say, almost as monkeys are to men.” ... “Compare the gifts of magnanimity, temperance, humanity and religion of these men,” continues Democrats, “with those homunculi [i.e., the Indians] in whom hardly a vestige of humanity remains.”

—Ginés de Sepúlveda (cited by Pagden)
The major reason for writing (this book) was that of seeing all and such an infinite number of the nations of this vast part of the world slandered (defamed) by those who did not fear God . . . [and who published] it abroad that the peoples of these parts, were peoples who lacked sufficient reason to govern themselves properly, were deficient in public policy (and) in well-ordered states (republics) . . . as if Divine Providence, in its creation of such an innumerable number of rational souls, had carelessly allowed human nature to so err . . . in the case of such a vast part of the human lineage (de linaje humano) as is comprised by these people allowing them to be born lacking in sociality, and therefore, as monstrous peoples, against the natural tendency of all the peoples of the earth . . .

—Fr. Bartolomé de Las Casas, Apologetic History of the Indies

I am talking of millions of men who have been skillfully injected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, abasement.

—Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism

Leopoldo: If a breach of natural law is a just cause for making war, either I am wrong, or there will be no nation on earth that cannot be militarily attacked because of their sins against, or breaches of, the natural law. Tell me then, how many and which nations do you expect to find who fully observe the law of nature?

Democrats: Many do, I am sure: [but] there are no nations which call themselves civilized and are civilized who do not observe natural law.

—Ginés de Sepúlveda, The Second Democrats, or On the Just Causes of War Against the Indians

Clearly one cannot prove in a short time or with a few words to infidels that to sacrifice men to God is contrary to nature. Consequently neither anthropophagy nor human sacrifice constitutes just cause for making war on certain kingdoms. . . . For the rest, to sacrifice innocents for the salvation of the Commonwealth is not opposed to natural reason, is not something abominable and contrary to nature, but is an error that has its origin in natural reason itself.

—Las Casas’s reply to Ginés de Sepúlveda
And there is no difference with respect to the duties imposed upon these who do not know him, (the True God as we Christians do) as long as they hold some God to be the true God, and honor him as such.... This is because the mistaken conscience/consciousness (la conciencia errónea) obliges and compels exactly the same way as does the true/a correct one (la conciencia recta).

—Las Casas, Tratados de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (Third Treatise)

The priest Casas having at the time no knowledge of the unjust methods which the Portuguese used to obtain slaves, advised that permission should be given for the import of slaves into the islands, an advice which, once he became informed about these methods, he would not have given for the world.... The remedy which he proposed to import Black slaves in order to liberate the Indians was not a good one, even though he thought the Black slaves, at the time to have been enslaved with a just title; and it is not at all certain that his ignorance at the time or even the purity of his motive will sufficiently absolve him when he finds himself before the Divine Judge.

—Las Casas, History of the Indies (vol. 3)

... Doctor Sepúlveda, before dealing with an issue of which he had no direct knowledge should have sought information from those servants of God, who have toiled day and night to preach to convert the peoples of the Indies, rather than have rushed to pay heed to and give credit to those profane and tyrannical men who, in order to justify the expropriations (latrocinio) robberies and murders that they have committed, as well as the usurped social rank to which they have climbed doing so at the cost of the vast torrents of spilled blood, of the suffering and damnation of an infinite number of innocent souls, have persuaded him to write his thesis [i.e., in defence of their position/interests].

—Las Casas, Tratados

Culture, in my view, is what a human being creates and what creates a human being at the same time. In culture, the human being is simultaneously creator and creation. This is what makes culture different from both the natural and the supernatural; because in the supernatural we have the world of
the Creator, and in nature we have the world of creations. The coincidence of these two roles in a human being is what makes him a cultural being. . . . Transculture means a space in, or among, cultures, which is open to all of them. Culture frees us from nature; transculture frees us from culture, from any one culture.

—Mikhail Epstein, “Postcommunist Postmodernism: An Interview”

About the Pope being the Lord of all the universe in the place of God, and that he had given the lands of the Indies to the King of Castille, the Pope must have been drunk when he did it, for he gave what was not his. . . . The king who asked for and received this gift must have been some madman for he asked to have given to him that which belonged to others.

—Cenú Indians’ reply to the Spaniards

Two different anthropologies and their respective origin models/narratives had inscribed two different descriptive statements of the human, one which underpinned the evangelizing mission of the Church, the other the imperializing mission of the state based on its territorial expansion and conquest. Nevertheless, rather than merely a Christian/classics opposition, the second descriptive statement, that of “Man” as political subject of the state, was to be instead a syncretized synthesis of the anthropology of the classics drawn into a secularizing Judeo-Christian framework, and therefore into the field of what Latour would call the West’s “constitution with a capital C.”

This syncretism had already been at work in the formulations of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. For the latter, classical thought had enabled him, as part of his revalorizing strategy of natural man, to fuse the original Judeo-Christian conception of the human as being made in the image of God, with the view of Platonic philosophy in which man is defined by the fact of the choice that he can give himself to adopt “the sensual life of an animal or the philosophical life of the gods.” Ficino had also defined man in terms derived from both Christian and Platonic, as well as other pre-Christian sources as a creature standing between “the physical world of nature” and “the spiritual
world of the angels of God”: as balanced between “natural” and “supernatural” order. It was in the context of this syncretized reinscription that the new criterion of Reason would come to take the place of the medieval criterion of the Redeemed Spirit as its transumed form—that the master code of symbolic life (“the name of what is good”) and death (“the name of what is evil”) would now become that of reason/sensuality, rationality/irrationality in the reoccupied place of the matrix code of Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh. The descriptive statement instituting of the humanists’ Man would therefore use the Judeo-Christian answer to the what and who we are (i.e., the “human created in the image of God,” but later become the embodiment of Original Sin) to revalorize the medieval order’s fallen natural man by proposing that, because “God is included in man in that an image embodies and includes its exemplar,” human reason had remained “lord over the senses similar to the way in which God is lord over his creatures.”

The relation here is one of analogy. While reason is not a god, “it partakes of some of God’s functions” in that it is intended to rule over a “lower order of reality.” The fundamental separation for Pico was one between two orders of creation, with man placed by God at the midpoint between them. These were, on the one hand, the “super-celestial” regions with minds (i.e., angels, pure intelligences), and on the other, a region “filled with a diverse throng of animals, the cast off and residual parts of the lower world.” Placed between these two realms, man was the only creature “confined by no bounds,” free to “fix limits of nature” for himself, free to be “molder and maker of himself” (see Pico’s guide-quote). Rather than the medieval Christian’s choice of remaining enslaved to the Fallen Flesh and to Original Sin, or seeking to be Redeemed-in-the-Spirit through the sacraments of the Church, this newly invented Man’s choice is that of either growing downwards into the lower natures of brutes, or responding to the Creator’s call to grow “upward” to “higher” and “divine” natures (Miller 1965).

With this redescription, the medieval world’s idea of order as based upon degrees of spiritual perfection/imperfection, an idea of order centered on the Church, was now to be replaced by a new one based upon degrees of rational perfection/imperfection. And this was to be the new “idea of order” on whose basis the coloniality of being, enacted by the dynamics of the rela-
tion between Man—overrepresented as the generic, ostensibly supracultural human—and its subjugated Human Others (i.e., Indians and Negroes), together with, as Quijano notes, the continuum of new categories of humans (i.e., mestizos and mulattos to which their human/subhuman value difference gave rise), was to be brought into existence as the foundational basis of modernity. With this revealing that, from the very origin, the issue of race, as the issue of the Colonial Question, the Nonwhite/Native Question, the Negro Question, yet as one that has hitherto had no name, was and is fundamentally the issue of the genre of the human, Man, in its two variants—the issue of its still ongoing production/reproduction in the form of the second variant.

The clash between Las Casas and Sepúlveda was a clash over this issue—the clash as to whether the primary generic identity should continue to be that of Las Casas’s theocentric Christian, or that of the newly invented Man of the humanists, as the rational (or ratiocentric) political subject of the state (the latter as the “descriptive statement” in whose terms Sepúlveda spoke). And this clash was to be all the more deep-seated in that the humanists, while going back to the classics and to other pre-Christian sources in order to find a model of being human alternative to the one in whose terms the lay world was necessarily subordinated, had effected their now new conception and its related “formulation of a general order of existence” only by transuming that of the Church’s matrix Judeo-Christian conception, thereby carrying over the latter’s schematic structure, as well as many of its residual meanings.

In this transumed reformulation, while the “significant ill” of mankind’s enslavement was no longer projected as being to the negative legacy of Adamic Original Sin, the concept of enslavement was carried over and redescribed as being, now, to the irrational aspects of mankind’s human nature. This redescription had, in turn, enabled the new behavior-motivating “plan of salvation” to be secularized in the political terms of the this-worldly goals of the state. Seeing that because the “ill” or “threat” was now that of finding oneself enslaved to one’s passions, to the particularistic desires of one’s human nature, salvation/redemption could only be found by the subject able to subdue his private interests in order to adhere to the laws of the
politically absolute state, and thereby to the “common good.” This meant that the primary behavior-motivating goal, rather than that of seeking salvation in the civitas dei, was now that of adhering to the goal of the civitas saecularis (Pocock 1975): the goal, that is, of seeking to ensure the stability, order, and territorial expansion of the state in a competitive rivalry with other European states. This at the same time as the primacy of the earlier religious ethic, as defended by Las Casas from a universalistic Christian perspective, was replaced by the new ethic of “reasons of state,” as the ethic carried by a Sepúlveda whose civic humanist values were still, at the time, only incipiently emergent. However, it is the latter ethic that, given the existential sociopolitical and commercial, on-the-ground processes that were to lead to the rapid rise of the centralizing state, to its replacement of the medieval system-ensemble with its monarchical own (Hubner 1983), and to the expanding mercantilism with its extra-European territorial conquests, exponentially accelerated was soon to triumph and become the accepted doctrine of the times.

Nowhere is this mutation of ethics seen more clearly than in two plays written in the first decades of the seventeenth century: one the well-known play by Shakespeare, The Tempest; the other the less well-known play by Spain’s Lope de Vega, written at roughly the same time and entitled The New World Discovered by Christopher Columbus. In the plot of The Tempest, the central opposition is represented as being between Prospero and Caliban; that is, between Higher Reason as expressed in the former, and irrational, sensual nature as embodied in the latter. The drunken sailors, Stephano and Trinculo, had also, like Caliban, been shown as embodying that enslavement to the irrational aspects of human nature (if to a lesser degree than the latter) which Prospero must repress in himself if he is to act as a rational ruler; that is, one for whom the securing of the stability and order of the state (in effect, reasons-of-state) had now to be the overriding imperative, the major this-worldly goal. And while Miranda as woman, and as a young girl, is shown as poised at midpoint between rational and irrational nature, she is pre-assured of attaining to the former status because of her father’s tutoring. This master code of rational nature/irrational nature, together with the new “idea of order” as that of degrees of rational perfection in place of the
earlier degrees of spiritual perfection, is also seen to be at work in Lope's play, even where syncretized with the earlier religious ethic within the context of Spain's Counter Reformation order of discourse. There, the rational/irrational master code contrasts the rational Christian king and queen of Spain, Ferdinand and Isabel, as opposed, on the one hand, to the "irrational" Moorish prince of Granada—who is shown dallying with the sensual pleasures of love while Ferdinand and Isabel capture Granada, displacing him ("Orientalism" has an even longer history than Said has traced!)—and on the other, and most totally so, to the "irrational" because tyrannical Arawak cacique who, because of his forcible abduction of the bride-to-be of one of his subjects, is shown to be as justly expropriated of his sovereignty, his lands, and his religion as Caliban is "justly" expropriated of his in The Tempest. In both plays, therefore, the Human Other figures to the generic human embodied in Prospero and in the Catholic king and queen are made to embody the postulate of "significant ill" of enslavement to the lower, sensory aspects of "human nature." At the same time, the generic human bearer-figures of the politically rational are made to actualize the new, transumed formulation and its conception of freedom as having no longer mastery over Original Sin (as well as over those Enemies-of-Christ who as such remain enslaved to it), but rather of mastery over their own sensory, irrational nature—and, as well, of all those Human Other categories who, like Shakespeare's Caliban and Lope de Vega's Dulcanquellín, are stigmatized as remaining totally enslaved to theirs.

But perhaps what Shakespeare's Reformation play reveals, more clearly than does Lope de Vega's Counter Reformation one, is the profound shift in the grounds of legitimacy of which Sepúlveda had been the proponent in the 1550s dispute with Las Casas, and that were now being instituted in early seventeenth-century Western Europe. That is, the shift in the terms by which the latter's ongoing expropriation of New World lands and the subsequent reduction of the indigenous peoples to being a landless, rightless, neo-serf work force—together with the accelerated mass slave trade out of Africa to the Americas and the Caribbean and the instituting of the large-scale slave plantation system that that trade made possible—will be made to seem just and legitimate to its peoples. In addition, the way in which this shift will be
linked to another shift (one by which Western Europe’s categorization of the “Indians” and “Negroes” in now secular rather than in the earlier religious terms of Otherness: the new terms, therefore, of Quijano’s “Racism/Ethnicism” complex) will be effected.

As Valentin Mudimbe documents in his *The Invention of Africa* (1988), beginning in 1444 with the Portuguese landfall on the shores of Senegal West Africa, all the actions that were to be taken by European-Christians—their enslavement of non-Christians whom they first classified in theological terms as Enemies-of-Christ, whether those of Africa or those of the New World, together with their expropriation of the lands of the peoples on both continents (limitedly so, at that time, in the case of Africa; almost totally so in the case of the Americas)—were initially seen as just and legitimate in Christian theological terms. In these terms, all the concessions of non-European lands by the pope to the Portuguese and Spanish sovereigns were effected by means of several papal bulls that defined these lands as ones that, because not belonging to a Christian prince, were terra nullius (“the lands of no one”), and so legitimately expropriated by Christian kings (Mudimbe 1988). In other words, they were so seen within the terms of the adaptive truth-for of their “local culture’s” still hegemonic descriptive statement of the human, and of the order of knowledge to which that statement gave rise. And, therefore, as the truth of the “single culture” in whose theocentric terms they thought and acted (Epstein 1993), whose truth they believed to be as supernaturally ordained as we now believe ours to be “objective” because, ostensibly, supraculturally true.

This means that the large-scale accumulation of unpaid land, unpaid labor, and overall wealth expropriated by Western Europe from non-European peoples, which was to lay the basis of its global expansion from the fifteenth century onwards, was carried out within the order of truth and the self-evident order of consciousness, of a creed-specific conception of what it was to be human—which, because a monotheistic conception, could not conceive of an Other to what it experienced as being human, and therefore an Other to its truth, its notion of freedom. Its subjects could therefore see the new peoples whom it encountered in Africa and the New World only as the “pagan-idolators,” as “Enemies-of-Christ” as the Lack of its own nar-
rative ideal. This was consequential. It set in motion the secularizing rein-
vention of its own matrix Christian identity as Man. The non-Europeans
that the West encountered as it expanded would classify the West as “abnor-
mal” relative to their own experienced Norm of being human, in the
Otherness slot of the gods or the ancestors. This was the case with the
Congoles who, seeing the white skin of the Europeans as a sign of mon-
strous deviance to their Bantu genre/norm of being human, classified them
together with their deceased ancestors (Axelson 1970). For the Europeans,
however, the only available slot of Otherness to their Norm, into which they
could classify these non-European populations, was one that defined the lat-
ter in terms of their ostensible subhuman status (Sahlins 1995).

The creation of this secular slot of Otherness as a replacement for the
theocentric slot of Otherness in which non-European peoples had been clas-
sified in religious terms as Enemies-of-Christ, pagan-idolators, thereby
incorporating them into the theological system of legitimacy—which, as set
out in the papal bulls from the 1455 Romanus Pontifex onwards, had pro-
vided the framework in whose terms their ostensibly “lands of no one/terra
nullius” had been seeable as justly expropriable, and they themselves justly
enslavable as such pre-classified populations—was taking place, however, in
the wider context of the overall sociopolitical and cultural transformation
that had been set in motion in Western Europe from the Renaissance
onwards, one correlated with the challenge of the then ascendant modern
European monarchical state to the centralizing post-Gregorian hegemony of
the Church.

In this context, Anthony Pagden has excellently documented the shift
that would eventually take place in the grounds of legitimacy in whose terms
Europeans were to see themselves as justly expropriating the lands and liv-
ing space of the indigenous peoples of the New World. This shift, as he
shows, would occur as a direct result of the fact that while, at first, the
Spanish state had depended on the pope’s having divided up the New World
between Spain and Portugal, doing this in exchange for the promise that
their respective states would help to further the evangelizing mission of
Christianity, the Spanish sovereigns had soon become impatient with the
papacy’s claim to temporal as well as to spiritual sovereignty. In conse-
quence, King Ferdinand of Spain, wanting to claim temporal sovereignty for himself as he set out to institute the first Western European world empire, had summoned several councils comprised of jurists and theologians. He had then given them the mandate that they should come up with new grounds for Spain's sovereignty, which moved outside the limits of the sovereignty over the temporal world claimed by the papacy.

The fact that the theological grounds of the legitimacy both of Spain's sovereignty over the New World and of its settlers' rights to the indigenous people's lands (as well as of the latter's right, in the early period, to carry out slave-trading raids on the American mainland) had come upon a central obstacle made this matter all the more urgent. The obstacle was this: all the basic concepts of the theological system of legitimation—i.e., that the lands of non-Christian princes were terra nullius and as such justly expropriable by Christian princes; that the indigenous peoples could be enserfed or even enslaved where necessary—had come to founder upon a stubborn fact. This was that the indigenous peoples of the New World could not be classified as Enemies-of-Christ, since Christ's apostles had never reached the New World, never preached the Word of the Gospel to them. Which meant that because they could not have ever refused to hear the Word, they could not (within the terms of the orthodox theology of the Church) be classified as Christ-Refusers, their lands justly taken, and they themselves enslaved and/or enserfed with a "just title."

The life-long struggle of Bartolomé de Las Casas, the Spanish missionary priest, in the wake of his 1514 conversion experience, to save the Caribbean Arawaks from the ongoing demographic catastrophe that followed both their infection by new diseases to which they had no immunity and their subjection to the harsh, forced-labor regime of the Spaniards was a struggle waged precisely on the basis of the fact that such subjection could not be carried out with a "just title." This was, therefore, to lead him to make a fateful proposal, one that was to provide the charter of what was to become the Black-diasporic presence in the Americas. This proposal was that African slaves, whom he then believed to have been acquired with a just title, should be brought in limited numbers as a labor force to replace the Indians. This proposal, which kick-started what was to be the almost four-centuries-
long slave trade out of Africa, had therefore been the result of his struggle not to replace “Indians with Africans,” as Liberal historians who think in biocentric, classificatory terms would have it—but rather, within the theological terms in which Las Casas thought and fought, to replace those whom he knew from first hand to have been enslaved and enserfed outside the “just title” terms of orthodox Christian theology with others whom, as he thought at the time, had been acquired within the terms of those “just titles.” The cited passage (see Las Casas guide-quote) reveals that Las Casas, when he later found out that the African slaves had been no less ruthlessly acquired outside the terms of the same just titles than had been the Indians, was to bitterly repent of his proposal. But by then, the mass slave trade from Africa across the Atlantic that would give rise to today’s transnational Black Diaspora had taken on a life and unstoppable dynamic of its own.

Las Casas had thought and acted in the terms of his Christian evangelizing imperative. The Spanish state’s primary imperative, however, was that of its territorial expansion, of realizing its imperial goals of sovereignty over the new lands. Its jurists had, in this context, at first attempted to get around the Enemies-of-Christ obstacle by means of a judicial document called “The Requisition” (“Requerimento”). A hybridly theologico-juridical document, written in Latin, the Requisition was supposed to be read out to groups of assembled indigenes by a notary who was to accompany any slave-raiding, land-expropriating expedition that sailed from the first settled Caribbean islands to the mainland. This document was intended to ensure that the indigenes in question literally heard the Word of the Christian Gospel, so that they could then be later classified as having refused it, and therefore as Enemies-of-Christ. The document proclaimed to the indigenes that Christ, who was king over the world, had granted this sovereignty to the pope, who had in turn granted the lands of their “barbarous nations” to the king of Spain, who had sent the expedition members as his emissaries. The expeditionaries had been sent to give the indigenes the choice of accepting the king of Spain’s sovereignty over their lands, together with their acceptance of Christ’s Word and, with it, of conversion to Christianity. If they accepted the king’s sovereignty together with conversion, they would be unharmed. Should they refuse (thereby making themselves Christ-Refusers and
Enemies-of-Christ), they would be attacked, captured, justly enslaved—their lands justly expropriated. If Las Casas was to write that on reading this document he did not know whether to laugh or cry, the reported reply by the Cenú peoples on the mainland to one such expedition opens a transcultural cognitive frontier onto the way in which, to use Marshall Sahlins’ phrase (if somewhat inverting its meaning) “natives think” (Sahlins 1990), and law-likely so within the terms of their/our order-specific modes of adaptive cognition-for, truth-for.

Seen from hindsight, what the Cenú are saying (see Cenú/Greenblatt guide-quote) is that, outside the “local cultural” field of what was then Western Europe, and therefore outside the adaptive truth-for terms of its monarchical-Christian genre of being human, the speech of the Requisition was “mad and drunken”: speech that was meaningless. Since it was only in the terms of what could seem just and legitimate to a specific genre of being human that the lands of non-Christian and non-European peoples could have been seen as the pope’s to give, or the king of Castile’s to take. What is of specific interest here is not only that it was this initial, large-scale, one-sided accumulation of lands, wealth, power, and unpaid labor by the West that was to provide the basis for today’s 20/80 wealth and power ratio between the world’s peoples, but also that this primary accumulation had been effected on the basis of a truth-for, or system of ethno-knowledge, that was no less non-veridical outside the viewpoint of its subjects than the premise the Portuguese and Columbus’s voyages had only recently disproved—i.e., the premise that the Earth was nonhomogeneously divided into habitable within God’s Grace and uninhabitable outside it. Seeing that what we also come upon is the nature of our human cognitive dilemma, one that is the very condition of their/our existence as hybridly nature-culture beings, the dilemma is how, in Epstein’s terms, we can be enabled to free ourselves from our subordination to the one culture, the one descriptive statement that is the condition of us being in the mode of being that we are (Epstein 1993).

That vast dilemma, which is that of our still-unresolved issue of consciousness (McGinn 1999) was one that Las Casas brilliantly touched upon when, referring to the Aztecs’ practice of human sacrifice, he stated that a
mistaken (i.e., adaptive) consciousness/conscience impels and obliges no less than does a true one. However, not only the Cenú Indians, but the Spaniards themselves had also come to realize the invalid nature of their attempt to get around the theological concept of Enemies-of-Christ. In consequence, as Pagden tells us, the Spanish Crown had, from early on, initiated the adoption of new grounds of legitimacy that were to eventually make the Requisition document unnecessary. The councils of jurists/theologians that King Ferdinand set up for this purpose had come up with a formula that, adopted from *The Politics* of Aristotle, would not only enable the master trope of Nature (seen as God’s agent on Earth) to take the latter’s authoritative place, but would also effect a shift from the Enemies-of-Christ/Christ-Refusers system of classification to a new and even more powerfully legitimating one. It was here that the modern phenomenon of race, as a new, extrahumanly determined classificatory principle and mechanism of domination (Quijano 2000), was first invented, if still in its first religio-secular form. For the indigenous peoples of the New World, together with the mass-enslaved peoples of Africa, were now to be reclassified as “irrational” because “savage” Indians, and as “subrational” Negroes, in the terms of a formula based on an a-Christian premise of a by-nature difference between Spaniards and Indians, and, by extrapolation, between Christian Europeans and Negroes. This neo-Aristotelian formula had been proposed by the Scottish theologian John Mair.

A new notion of the world and “idea of order” was being mapped now, no longer upon the physical cosmos—which beginning with the fifteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese and Columbus, as well as with the new astronomy of Copernicus, was eventually to be freed from having to serve as a projected “space of Otherness,” and as such having to be known in the adaptive terms needed by human orders to represent their social structures as extrahumanly determined ones. Instead, the projected “space of Otherness” was now to be mapped on phenotypical and religio-cultural differences between human variations and/or population groups, while the new idea of order was now to be defined in terms of degrees of rational perfection/imperfection, as degrees ostensibly ordained by the Greco-Christian cultural construct deployed by Sepúlveda as that of the “law of nature,” “nat-
ural law”: as a “law” that allegedly functioned to order human societies in the same way as the newly discovered laws of nature served to regulate the processes of functioning of physical and organic levels of reality.

It is, therefore, the very humanist strategy of returning to the pagan thought of Greece and Rome for arguments to legitimate the state’s rise to hegemony, outside the limits of the temporal sovereignty claimed by the papacy, that now provides a model for the invention of a by-nature difference between “natural masters” and “natural slaves,” one able to replace the Christian/Enemies-of-Christ legitimating difference. For while Mair does not specifically use the term rational, the thesis of a by-nature difference in rationality (one transumed today into a by-Evolution “difference” in a substance called I.Q.) was to be central to the new legitimation of Spain’s right to sovereignty, as well as of its settlers’ rights both to the land and to the labor of the Indians. With, in consequence, the institution of the encomienda system, which attached groups of Indians to settlers as a neoserf form of labor, together with the institution of the slave plantation system manned by “Negroes” coming to centrally function so as to produce and reproduce the socioeconomic and ontological hierarchies of the order as if indeed they had been mandated by the ostensibly extrahuman agency of “natural law.”

For the settlers—as well as for their humanist royal historian and chaplain, Ginés de Sepúlveda, who defended their claims (against the opposition of the Dominican missionaries and, centrally so, of Las Casas, who sought to put an end to the encomienda labor system)—the vast difference that existed in religion and culture between the Europeans and the indigenous peoples was clear evidence of the latter’s lack of an ostensibly supracultural natural reason. The quite Other form of life and mode of being human of the indigenous peoples were therefore simply seen by the Spaniards as the irrational Lack of their own. So that even when confronted, as in the case of the Aztecs, with the latter’s complex and well-organized imperial civilization—one, however, based on the central institution of large-scale human sacrifice—Sepúlveda was able to argue that this practice by itself was clear evidence of the Aztecs’ lack of “natural reason”: of their having therefore been determined by “natural law” to be the “natural slaves” of the Spaniards.
In opposition to this thesis, and from the perspective of his own universalist Christianity and evangelizing imperative, Las Casas was to put forward, in his formal dispute with Sepúlveda in 1556, one of the earliest attempts at a transcultural mode of thinking—one that was almost heretical to his own Christian religious beliefs. He had counter-argued that the Aztec practice of human sacrifice was a religious practice that, rather than giving proof of the Aztecs’ lack of rational reason, proved itself to be an error of reason itself. This, given that to the Aztecs human sacrifice, “the sacrifice of innocents for the good of the commonwealth,” was a practice that was not only seen by them to be a legitimate, just, and rational act, but was also one that had seemed to them to be a pious and virtuous one. In effect, an act that had been seen as being as righteous and virtuous by the Aztecs in their adaptive truth-for terms (based on their having mistaken, from Las Casas’s Christian perspective, their false gods for the true One) as the Spanish settlers’ expropriation of the indigenous peoples’ lands and the enserfment of their lives/labor would come to seem just and legitimate to them within the adaptive truth-for and incipiently secular terms of the new “reasons-of-state” legitimation now being put forward by Sepúlveda.

The universally applicable Christianity in the terms of whose schema of Divine Election and Damnation Las Casas waged his struggle (terms that, once he had been informed by his fellow Portuguese missionaries of the unjust and rapacious methods used by the Portuguese to acquire African slaves, would lead him to confess that his proposal put his own soul in mortal danger), and the identity that he had experienced as primary—that of being a Christian (an identity that had impelled him to do “all that one ought to as a Christian,” which for him had centrally included making use of the state as a means of evangelizing the Indians) were increasingly being made secondary. This at the same time as the new identity of the “political subject” (one defined by a “reasons-of-state ethic,” which instead used the Church for its own this-worldly purpose) came to take center stage—the new identity of which intellectuals like Sepúlveda were now the bearers.

In consequence, the humanist counter-discourse of the latter, which functioned in the terms of this new descriptive statement and of its “reasons-of-state ethic,” now became the new “common sense” (as we see it
enacted in Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*) of the pre-Enlightenment, pre-
Darwinian era. It was therefore within the terms of this new “common
sense”—and in the context of his defense of the settlers’ rights to the lands
and enserfed labor of the indigenous peoples, as well as of the Crown’s right
to wage just war against the latter if they resisted its sovereignty—that
Sepúlveda further elaborated Mair’s proposed legitimating of neo-
Aristotelian by-nature difference, defining it as one based not only on dif-
ferential degrees of rationality, but also as being human, of humanity.

Here we see the fatal error attendant on the West’s degodding of its reli-
gious Judeo-Christian descriptive statement of the human at its clearest.
While, as Christians, Westerners could see other peoples as also having gods
(even if, for them, necessarily “false” ones as contrasted with their “true” and
single One), as subjects defined by the identity Man, this could no longer be
the case. Seeing that once its “descriptive statement” had been instituted as
the only, universally applicable mode of being human, they would remain
unable, from then on until today, of (to paraphrase Lyotard) conceiving an
Other to what they call human (Lyotard 1990). And where the matrix
Christian conception of the human, which not only knew itself to be creed-
specific, but which had also been one carried by a Church that had been
engaged for hundreds of years in Europe itself in the Christianizing conver-
sion of pagan peoples, had compelled its missionaries to engage in tran-
screedal, transcultural modes of cognition, even where transforming the
pagan gods into the satanic figure of their Christian Devil—for the human-
ists’ “Man,” overrepresented as the supracultural, super-creedal human itself,
this was not possible. Hence the logic by which, for the humanist Sepúlveda,
the religious practices of the Aztecs were, so to speak, “crimes against
humanity,” breaches of the ostensible universally applicable “natural law”—
a law that imposed a by-nature divide between “civilized” peoples (as true
generic humans who adhered to its Greco-European cultural construct) and
those, like the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the Caribbean, who
did not. As such, the New World peoples had to be seen and constructed,
increasingly by all Europeans, in neo-Sepúlvedan terms as forms of Human
Otherness, if to varying degrees, to a now secularizing West’s own. And while
a Las Casas, in the context of his struggle against both Mair’s and Sepúlveda’s
theses, would see, from his own universalist-Christian perspective, that their systemic classifying of the indigenous peoples as “by nature” different from, and inferior to, the Spaniards, and as almost subhuman—that further, their (in his terms) deliberate “slandering” of an entire population, of a “large part of God’s Creation” had the directly instrumental purpose of subordinating the peoples whom they slandered in order to expropriate their lands and to reduce them as a population to enserfed encomienda labor (to render them, in Peter Carlo’s term, landless and rightless)—this “slandering” was nevertheless not arbitrary.

Instead, it was a constitutive part of the new order of adaptive truth-for that had begun to be put in place with the rise to hegemony of the modern state, based on the new descriptive statement of the human, Man, as primarily a political subject—of, therefore, the West’s own self-conception. As a result, seen from a transcultural perspective in the context of the “local cultural field” of a Judeo-Christian/Latin-Christian Europe that was in the process of reinstituting itself as the secular imperial entity, the West, this “slandering” both of Indians and of Negroes can be seen in its precise role and function. That is, as a lawlike part of the systemic representational shift being made out of the order of discourse that had been elaborated on the basis of the Judeo-Christian Spirit/Flesh organizing principle (one in whose logic the premise of nonhomogeneity, articulating its master code of symbolic life and death, had been mapped onto the physical cosmos) to the new rational/irrational organizing principle and master code. And as one whose foundational premise of nonhomogeneity, which was now to be mapped onto a projected, ostensibly divinely created difference of substance between rational humans and irrational animals, would also come to be mapped at another “space of Otherness” level. This level was that of a projected Chain of Being comprised of differential/hierarchical degrees of rationality (and thereby, as shown in the quote from Sepúlveda, of humanity) between different populations, their religions, cultures, forms of life; in other words, their modes of being human. And while the West placed itself at the apex, incorporating the rest (the majority of whom it would come to dominate in terms of their differential degrees of distance from, or nearness to, its now hegemonic, secularizing, and single own), and was to legitimate its relation
of dominance over them all in the terms of its single culture’s adaptive truth-
for, it was to be the figure of the Negro (i.e., the category comprised by all
peoples of Black African hereditary descent) that it was to place at the nadir
of its Chain of Being; that is, on a rung of the ladder lower than that of all
humans, lower even than that of Sepúlveda’s New World homunculi.

While “indios” and “negros,” Indians and Negroes, were to be both made
into the Caliban-type referents of Human Otherness to the new rational self-
conception of the West, there was also, therefore (as Poliakov notes), a
marked differential in the degrees of subrationality, and of not-quite-human-
ness, to which each group was to be relegated within the classificatory logic
of the West’s ethnocultural field. From the beginning, it would be the
“Negroes” who would be consigned to the pre-Darwinian last link in the
Chain of Being—to the “missing link” position, therefore, between rational
humans and irrational animals. And while the fact that the “Indians” were,
by the late 1530s, declared to be de jure, if not altogether de facto, free (and
as such vassals of the Crown like the Spaniards, if still secondary “native”
ones) at the same time as the “Negroes” would continue to constitute the
only outrightly enslaved labor force, and this fact was a partial cause of this
differential, there was an additional major and powerful factor. This factor
was that of the role that the black skin and somatotype of peoples of African
hereditary descent had been made to play, for centuries, in the elaboration
of monotheistic Christianity, as well as in all three monotheisms, all of which
had been religions instituted by population groups who were white-skinned,
or at least, not black-skinned. With the result that the intellectuals of these
groups, in developing the symbolic systems of their monotheistic creeds,
had come to define these symbols in the terms of their own somatotype
norm, in the same way as the Bantu-Congolese had done in developing their
polytheistic own. An account of the early seventeenth-century kingdom of
the Congo, written by a Spanish Capuchin missionary priest (Father Antonio
de Teruel), reveals the above parallel, thereby providing us with a transgenre-
of-the-human, transcultural perspective.

The indigenous peoples of the Congo,” Teruel wrote, “are all black in
color, some more so, some less so. Many are to be seen who are the color of
chestnut and some tend to be more olive-colored. But the one who is of the
deepest black in color is held by them to be the most beautiful. Some are born somewhat light-skinned, but as they grow older they become darker and darker. This occurs because their mothers make use of the artifice of an ointment . . . with which they anoint their infants, exposing them once they have been anointed, to the rays of the sun, then leaving them there for long periods, and repeating this action over and over . . .” (Teruel 1663‒64; emphasis added)

Given the fact that a black skin is so highly regarded among them, we Europeans appear ugly in their eyes. As a result, children in those areas, where a white has never been seen before, would become terrified, fleeing in horror from us, no less than our children here are terrified by the sight of a black also fleeing in horror from them. But they do not want us to call them negroes (negros) but Blacks (Prietos); amongst them only slaves are called negroes and thus amongst them it is the same things to say negro as to say slave” (Teruel (1663‒1664) Ms. 3533:3574).

Unlike the Bantu-Congolese ethno-specific conception, however, the monotheists had projected their respective creeds as universally applicable ones, defining their God(s) and symbol systems as the only “true” ones. This was to be even more the case with respect to Christianity from the time of the Crusades onwards. With the result that, as the historian Fernández-Armesto noted in his description of the “mental horizons” of Christian Europeans at the time of their fourteenth-century expansion into the Mediterranean, followed by their expansions into the Atlantic, in the terms of those “horizons,” Black Africans had been already classified (and for centuries before the Portuguese landing on the shores of Senegal in 1444) in a category “not far removed from the apes, as man made degenerate by sin.” And while the roots of this projection had come from a biblical tradition common to all three monotheisms—that is, “that the sons of Ham were cursed with blackness, as well as being condemned to slavery”—in Europe, it had come to be elaborated in terms that were specific to Christianity. In this elaboration, the “diabolical color,” black, had become the preferred color for the depiction of “demons” and the signification of “sin”—the signifying
actualization, therefore, of Judeo-Christianity’s behavior-programming postulate of “significant ill” to its limit degree. So that as a result, in addition to their being co-classified with apes, who “iconographically . . . signified sin,” Black Africans were generally thought in “medieval ape lore,” a precursor to the theory of Evolution, to be “degenerate” descendants of “true man” (Fernández-Armesto 1987). Because all of these traditions reinforced each other, the “descendants of Ham” classificatory category that was to be deployed by the Europeans at the popular level, once the Enemies-of-Christ justificatory category had been discarded as legitimation of the mass enslavements of Africans (at the official level of Church doctrine, one of the justifications was also that the latter’s physical enslavement was a means of saving their souls), would be inextricably linked to Judeo-Christianity’s “formulations of a general order of existence,” to its descriptive statement of what it was to be a Christian—to be, therefore, in their own conception, the only possible and universally applicable mode of being human, yet as a mode which nonconsciously carried over, as the referent of “normalcy,” their own somatotype norm in the same way as their now purely secular and biocentric transformation of Christian, Man, overrepresented as if its referent were the human, now continues to do, even more totally so.

PART III

From the Iconography of Sin and the Christian Construction of Being to the Iconography of Irrationality and the Colonial Construction of Being: On the Paradox of the Mutation from Supernatural to Natural Causation.

Sepúlveda’s classification of the peoples of the Americas as homunculi, who—when contrasted to the Spaniards in terms of prudence and reason (ingenium)—are almost “like monkeys to men,” can be seen as transuming, or carrying over, the residual iconography of sin into the formulation of the new postulate of “significant ill” as that of being enslaved to the irrational aspects of one’s nature. So that, while the iconic figure of the “ape” is maintained because the earlier matrix ontological distinction between the con-
demned category of peoples enslaved to Original Sin, and the Elect category of those redeemed from this sin has now been recast in the terms of the “by-nature difference” of rationality, the “ape” figure will be deployed in the new terms of a secularizing iconography as the marker of a naturally determined zero degree of irrationality. So that, as the earlier ontological distinction between the Elect-Redeemed and the Condemned (a distinction that had been actualized by the relation between the category of the celibate clergy and that of the non-celibate laity) came to be replaced by the new distinction made between those determined by nature to be the possessors of reason, and those predestined by it to remain enslaved to a lack of such reason, this distinction will be actualized in a new relation. This was the relation, in the Americas and the Caribbean, between the European settlers classified as by nature a people of reason (gente de razón) and the non-European population groups “Indians” and “Negroes,” classified as “brute peoples without “reason” who were no less naturally determined to be so. It is here, therefore, that the figure of the Negro was now to be transferred, like that of the ape, from the earlier iconography of sin and its postulate of “significant ill” to the new iconography of irrationality, to its new postulate of “significant ill.” As a result, where before the “Negro” had been projected, within the terms of the Judeo-Christian imaginary, as the “figure” of the human made degenerate by sin, and therefore supernaturally determined (through the mediation of Noah’s curse laid upon the descendants of Ham) to be the nearest of all peoples to the ape, now he/she will be projected as the by-nature determined (i.e., caused) missing link between true (because rational) humans and the irrational figure of the ape. This at the same time as inside Europe, the increasingly interned figure of the Mad would itself come to function, within the terms of the same iconography, as the signifier of the “significant ill” of a threatened enslavement to irrationality in the reoccupied place of the medieval Leper, whose figure, in a parallel way to that of the “Negro,” had served as the intra-Christian-European signifier of the then “significant ill” of enslavement to Original Sin.

This alerts us to the dialectic at work in the epochal shift effected by the West from the explanatory model of supernatural causation to that of natural causation. That is, to the fact that it was the same explanatory model that
legitimated the large-scale expropriation and mass enslavement of two peoples on the grounds of a naturally determined difference of rational substance between them and their expropriators and slave masters that had, at the same time, made possible the rise and development of the physical sciences as a new order of human cognition. This meant that the same model that was to initiate the centuries-long degradation of two human groups for the benefit of another such group was to also set in motion the process that would emancipate the “objective set of facts” of the physical level of reality from having to be known in the adaptive truth-for terms in which it had been hitherto known by all human population groups. This had been so known, in exactly the same way as “Indians” and “Negroes” were now going to be “known” by Europeans, as an indispensable function of the mechanisms by means of which, as Godelier points out, all human groups have been enabled to make the fact that it is they/we who are the authors and agents of our own orders opaque to themselves/ourselves. Since they are mechanisms that function to project their/our authorship onto Imaginary supernatural Beings, as well as to represent the latter as being as much the creators of the physical cosmos onto which each order mapped its structuring principles, descriptive statement of the human, and correlated moral laws as they are of the subjects, who ostensibly merely mirror these laws in the organization of their/our own social hierarchies, divisions of labor, and role allocations.

Hence the logic by which, if the Copernican Revolution was to be only made possible by the West’s invention of Man outside the terms of the orthodox, “sinful by nature” descriptive statement and theocentric conception of the human, Christian, this was to be only fully effected by the parallel invention/instituting of the new categories that were to serve as the physical referents of Man’s Human Other. With the result that the same explanatory model that legitimated the expropriation and internment of the Indians, the mass enslavement of the Negroes, and the internment of the Mad—all ostensibly as living proof of their naturally determined enslavement to irrationality—will also underlie the cognitively emancipatory shift from the explanatory model of supernatural causation to that of natural causation, which made the natural sciences possible. The shift, therefore, from the explanatory principle of Divine Providence and/or retribution, as well as
from that of witchcraft and sorcery, to that of the new principle of laws of
nature, of events happening cursus solitus naturae (in the accustomed or
ordinary course of nature) as the explanatory model that underlay the sci-
entific revolution, both with respect to the physical sciences and, if more
slowly so, to the rise of modern medicine.

However, at the same time as the West initiated the process by means of
which the projection of extrahuman causation could no longer be mapped,
in good faith, on the physical levels of reality, it would also begin, in the wake
of its reinventing of its descriptive statement as that of Man in its first form,
to identify as its Imaginary extrahuman Being the figure of “Nature,” now
represented as the authoritative agent on earth of a God who, having created
it, has now begun to recede into the distance. So that as the earlier
Spirit/Flesh master code was being relegated to a secondary and increas-
ingly privatized space, the new rational/irrational master code, which was
to be the structuring of the rearranged hierarchies of the now centralized
political order of the modern state, was being projected upon another “space
of Otherness.” This was that of the projected hierarchy of a graduated table,
or Chain of all forms of sentient life, from those classified as the lowest to
those as the highest. It is, therefore, as the new rational/irrational line
(drawn between the fundamental ontological distinction of a represented
nonhomogeneity between divinely created-to-be-rational humans, on the
one hand, and divinely created-to-be irrational animals, on the other) comes
to be actualized in the institutionalized differences between European set-
tlers and Indians/Negroes, that the figure of the Negro as the projected miss-
ning link between the two sides of the rational/irrational divide will inevitably
come to be represented in the first “scientific” taxonomy of human popula-
tions, that of Linnaeus, as the population that, in contrast to the European
(which is governed by laws), is governed by caprice (Linnaeus 1735). So irra-
tional that it will have to be governed by others.

In consequence, and as Poliakov argues in The Aryan Myth (1974), it is
the population group classified as “Negro” by the West who would be made
to pay the most total psycho-existential price for the West’s epochal degod-
ding of both its matrix Judeo-Christian identity and the latter’s projection of
Otherness. Since, if that process called for the carrying over or transuming
(Bloom 1983) of the monotheistic macro-stereotype of all Black peoples as descendants of Noah’s son Ham (whom he had cursed, condemning his descendants to be the servants to the descendants of those of his two other sons, Japhet and Shem), and its reattachment to the new concept of the sub-rational Negro, condemned this time by the malediction of Nature rather than by Noah, this was because, in both cases, that stereotype had become indispensable to the mechanisms by which the Judeo-Christian West enacted its descriptive statement of the human—firstly as Christian, then as its first hybridly religio-secular variant, Man.

This in the same way in which it would remain indispensable to the enacting of the descriptive statement of the now purely secular because biocentric Darwinian variant of Man: one in which the Human Other malediction or curse, one shared with all the now colonized nonwhite peoples classified as “natives” (but as their extreme nigger form) would be no longer that of Noah or Nature, but of Evolution and Natural Selection. So that whatever the terms of derogatory clichés of which both the native and the “Negro” are the butt, what is clear is that its obsessive “name of what is evil” stereotyping functions as an indispensable part of the Godelier-type mechanism by which the subjects of the West (including those subjects like ourselves whom it has “westernized” and “modernized”) are enabled to make opaque to themselves/ourselves (according to the same nature-culture laws by which the subjects of all other human orders have done and do the same) the empirical fact of our ongoing production and reproduction of our order, of its genre of being human, its mode of consciousness or mind, and therefore of the latter’s adaptive truth-for. We are, as intellectuals, the agents of its formal elaboration.

The first form of the secularizing, “name of what is evil,” stereotyped role of the “Negro” was, however, different from the form it now takes. Poliakov links that first form, and the conceptual imaginative terms it would take, to a shift in the role played by that other major Other figure to the Judeo-Christian identity, the Jew. This shift began with the rise of the modern state in Spain, together with the centralizing of its order, from 1492 onwards. In that year, all Jews who adhered to their religion of Judaism were expelled, while shortly after, the conquered Islamic Moors of southern Spain began to
be forcibly converted to Christianity—both as effects of the goal of “religious unification” that was to be the basis of the monarchical order of Spain. In consequence, Poliakov points out—because a great number of Jews had accepted conversion to Christianity, rather than being expelled—the imposition of a single orthodox faith, that of Christianity, under the aegis of the Inquisition as an agent of the new state had given rise to the problem of the conversos or converts, either Moriscos (Muslim converts) or Marranos (Jewish converts). It was, therefore, in the context of the shift from being a primarily religious subject, for whom the “name of what is evil” was/is that of a common enslavement by all mankind to Original Sin, to that of being a political subject of a state (yet unified on the basis of its Christian creed) that the Other to the norm of this subject was to be the category of the conversos, both Marranos and Moriscos. A specific reprobation was therefore now placed on these two categories: that of their impurity or uncleanness of blood, and also of their faith, because descended from ancestors who had practiced the Jewish and the Islamic creeds.

If, as Harold Bloom notes, cultural fields are kept in being by transump- tive chains (Bloom 1982), it was to be the trope of “purity of blood,” together with that of its threatening “stain” (itself a “re-troped” form of the matrix negative construct of the “taint” of Original Sin) that, once re-troped as “racial purity,” would come to be attached to peoples of Black African hereditary descent. With the result that if the latter would (together with a range of other nonwhite “natives”) come to reoccupy the now purely secular place that had been earlier occupied by the Marrano and Morisco, the deep-seated belief in the pollution carried by their “negro blood” would lead to the theme of miscegenation coming to reoccupy the earlier foundational place that the incest had taken in all other human orders (Fox 1983). This at the same time as all members of this population were now to be constructed, discursively and institutionally, as the bottom marker—not now merely on a local scale, such as that of the “clean” Spanish-Christian scale of being, but instead of what was to become, from Sepúlveda onwards, that of a projected universally human scale of being. With this being so, whether in the terms of the Enlightenment’s “Nature,” or even more totally so in terms of the Darwinian paradigm of Evolution.
What Poliakov reveals here, therefore, is the nonarbitrary and systemic nature of the way in which the range of negatively marked tropes attached to the “figure” of the “Negro” were/are only the contemporary culmination of a process by means of which, beginning early on in the sixteenth century, a projected taxonomy of human population groups had begun to be put in place—one in which the “Negro” had to be, imperatively, at the bottom. Beginning with Peter Martyr’s 1516 definition of Indians as “white,” as contrasted with “black” Ethiopians, this placing was carried over in the first attempt at “racial classification” by François Bernier in 1684, which also assimilated the Indians to the white race now projected as the normal race. While the parallel systemic construction of the Black as the “abnormal” race can be seen in the generalization of the positive/negative value meanings (common to all European languages) as between mestizo (white/Indian) and mulatto (white/Black). What Poliakov further demonstrates is that, in the same way as the systemic construction of Moriscos and Marranos was an indispensable function of the inscribing and instituting of the norm subject of the Spanish religio-political monarchical state as a “clean” and therefore rational subject (rather than, as before, a subject seeking to be spiritually redeemed), so it is to be with respect to the role of the Black Other in the construction of Europeans as racially “pure,” secular subjects. In that, beginning with the West’s expansion in the fifteenth century, it would be the Black population group whose discursive and institutional degradation as the new ne plus ultra marker of barely human status (whether in the terms of Man₁ or of Man₂) was to be an indispensable function of the enacting of the descriptive statements by means of which the West was to effect its epochal de-supernaturalization of its matrix mode of being human. As redescriptions, that is, by means of which it would open the frontier onto natural-scientific knowledge, both of the physical and (after Darwin) of the biological levels of reality, at the same time as these redescriptions were to lead directly to the present “Two Cultures” divide of our contemporary order of knowledge.

So that if Darwin’s redescription of the human in now purely secular terms, and his deconstruction of the rational/irrational master code mapped on to a projected Chain of Being of all forms of sentient life, was to make possible the rise and development of the biological sciences, on the
one hand—it was, on the other, to provide the “new” ground for this “Two Cultures” organization/order of knowledge. That is, as one whose disciplinary fields were to be all based on the new description of the human as a purely biocentric being, and in whose terms not only the peoples of the Black Diaspora, but this time the peoples of Black Africa itself (as well as their continent, Africa), together with all the colonized dark-skinned “natives” of the world and the darker-skinned and poorer European peoples themselves, were now to find themselves/ourselves as discursively and institutionally imprisoned as the Indians, the Negroes-as-slaves and the Mad had been discursively and institutionally imprisoned in the terms of the descriptive statement of the earlier form of Man.

This principle, that of bio-evolutionary Natural Selection, was now to function at the level of the new bourgeois social order as a de facto new Argument-from-Design—one in which while one’s selected or dysselected status could not be known in advance, it would come to be verified by one’s (or one’s group’s) success or failure in life. While it was to be in the terms of this new Argument, with its postulate of the no less extrahuman (because bio-evolutionarily determined) ordering of our contemporary social and economic order, that the extreme situation both of the darker-skinned “natives” and of the Black in the West’s new conception of the human was, as it still continues to be, both discursively and institutionally constructed. With this construction serving as an indispensable function of the continued production and reproduction of our still hegemonic biocentric and ethnoclass descriptive statement of the human, Man, as the first represented to be a universally applicable “descriptive statement” of the human, because overrepresented as being isomorphic with the being of being human itself—and dependent, for its enactment, on a new “space of Otherness” principle of nonhomogeneity in the reoccupied place of the earlier rational/irrational line. This principle would be embodied in the new line that W. E. B. DuBois was to identify as the Color Line: that is, as a line drawn between the lighter and the darker peoples of the earth, and enforced at the level of social reality by the lawlikely instituted relation of socioeconomic dominance/subordination between them. With this line being as centrally a function of the enacting of our present biocentric, descriptive statement of the human as
(in the medieval order of Latin-Christian Europe) the institutionally and dis-
cursively enforced line drawn between the categories of the clergy and the
laity had been a central function of the enacting of the then theocentric
genre or descriptive statement of the human.

PART IV

From the Degodding of the Descriptive Statement to its
De-biologizing, from Natural to Nature-Culture Causation:
The Sixties, the Multiple Challenges to “Man,” and the
Colonial/Native/Negro/Third-World Questions, as the Genre
or the Assuming-of-”Man”-to-Be-the-Human Issue.

What is by common consent called the human sciences have their own
drama . . . [A]ll these discoveries, all these inquiries lead only in one direc-
tion: to make man admit that he is nothing, absolutely nothing—and that he
must put an end to the narcissism on which he relies in order to imagine that
he is different from the other “animals.” . . . This amounts to nothing more
nor less than man’s surrender. . . . Having reflected on that, I grasp my nar-
cissism with both hands and I turn my back on the degradation of those who
would make man a mere mechanism. . . . And truly what is to be done is to
set man free.

—Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks

Here the Argument returns to Margaret Boden’s point about the principal
metaphysical significance of artificial intelligence (Boden 1977), linking it to
Nicholas Humphrey’s distinction between the “objective” set of facts “out
there” and the way each organism—or (as the Argument’s extension of his
thesis puts it, each genre-of-the-human)—must lawlikely know its reality
primarily with reference to its own adaptively advantageous production/
reproduction as such a mode of being. Thus, what the range of anticolonial
movements at the level of the global (as well the multiple) social movements
internal to the United States and other First-World countries that took place
during the fifties and sixties fundamentally revealed was the gap that exists
between our present “mental construction of reality” as one projected from
the perspective (and to the adaptive advantage) of our present ethnoclass
genre of the human, Man, and its biocentric descriptive statement, and the
way our global social reality veridically is out there; that is, outside the view-
point of ethnoclass Man—of its genre of being, of truth, of freedom—as all
three are articulated in the disciplines of our present epistemological order
and its biocentric disciplinary discourses. The literary scholar Wlad Godzich
first made this point, if in somewhat different terms, when he wrote in 1986
on the great impact of the sociopolitical upheavals of the late fifties and six-
ties, particularly decolonization and liberation movements. And although
most of the new theoretical departures, he would add, were to be quickly
reterritorialized and re-coopted back into the mainstream orthodoxies of
our present disciplines, the fact is that (as noted earlier) some aspects of this
initial impact have remained (Godzich 1980).

That one of the central remaining manifestations of this impact was to
be that of feminist studies was due to a fundamental fact. This was that of
the way in which while before the sixties, the issues with which women were
concerned had been addressed only in the context of the Woman’s Question
of the Marxist paradigm (as, at that time, the only paradigm concerned with
the relation between knowledge and human emancipation), in the wake of
the sixties, women activists had ceased their earlier “echoing” of Marxist
thought and had redefined the Woman’s Question into an issue that was spe-
cific to their own concerns, rather than as merely being, as before, a subset
of what might be called the Labor Issue. Renaming themselves feminists,
they had redescribed their issue as that of gender and sexism, thereby tar-
geting the deconstruction of the social phenomenon of patriarchy as their
goal, rather than the mode-of-economic-production target of the Marxian
Labor issue. This has not been the case, however, with the issues that before
the sixties had been known as the Colonial Question, the “Native” (i.e. non-
white) and the Negro Question—all of which had been, like the Woman’s
Question, subsets of the Marxian Labor issue. This in spite of the fact that
at the empirical level, it was the multiple movements related to these ques-
tions that had most forcibly erupted in concrete political and social strug-
gles all over the globe, as well as internally in the United States.
The Argument proposes, on the basis of the first part of its title, that all of these Questions, ones that in the wake of the attaining of political independence by the former colonies or of the ending of segregation in the United States would come to be labeled instead as the Third-World and “Minority” Questions, now need to be redescribed in the terms of an issue that is specific to them—yet one that has hitherto had no name, seeing that it cannot exist as an “object of knowledge” within the terms of our present order of knowledge any more than, as Foucault points out, biological life could have existed as an object of knowledge in the classical (and in my terms, the pre-bourgeois) episteme. This issue is that of the genre of the human, the issue whose target of abolition is the ongoing collective production of our present ethnoclass mode of being human, Man: above all, its overrepresentation of its well-being as that of the human species as a whole, rather than as it is veridically: that of the Western and westernized (or conversely) global middle classes.

The paradox with which we are confronted here is the following: that in the wake of the intellectual revolution of the Renaissance, as carried out in large part by the lay humanists of the Renaissance on the basis of their revalorized redescription of the human as the rational, political subject, Man—on the basis, as Jacob Pandian points out, of their parallel invention of Man’s Human Others—Western intellectuals were to gradually emancipate knowledge of the physical cosmos from having to be known in the adaptive, order-maintaining terms in which it had hitherto been known by means of the rise and development of the physical sciences. This meant that increasingly, and for all human groups, the physical cosmos could no longer come to be validly used for such projections. Instead, the West’s new master code of rational/irrational nature was now to be mapped onto a projected Chain of Being of organic forms of life, organized about a line drawn between, on the one hand, divinely created-to-be-rational humans, and on the other, no less divinely created-to-be-irrational animals; that is, on what was still adaptively known through the classical discipline of “natural history” as a still supernaturally determined and created “objective set of facts.” This “space of Otherness” line of nonhomogeneity had then functioned to validate the socio-ontological line now drawn between rational, political Man (Prospero,
the settler of European descent) and its irrational Human Others (the categories of Caliban [i.e., the subordinated Indians and the enslaved Negroes]), in exactly the same way as, before Copernicus, the “space of Otherness” projection of a nonhomogeneity of substance between the perfection of the celestial realm and the degradation of the terrestrial had reciprocally bolstered and validated the Spirit/Flesh code as enacted in the ontological value difference between clergy and laity within the terms of Judeo-Christianity’s matrix formulation of a “general order of existence.” In the same way, therefore, as in the order of knowledge of pre-Newtonian Europe, all knowledge of the astronomy of the universe had had, however technically sophisticated and whatever its predictive power, to remain couched in ethno-astronomical terms, so all pre-Darwinian knowledge of organic life had had to be conceptualized in the terms of a (so to speak) proto- or ethno-biology.

The biological sciences were therefore to come into existence only in the wake of the second act of redescription effected during the nineteenth century by Liberal humanist intellectuals—as a redescription by means of which the still hybridly religio-secular political subject conception of the human, Man (as embodied in Prospero) was redefined as optimally economic Man, at the same time as this Man was redefined by Darwin as a purely biological being whose origin, like that of all other species, was sited in Evolution, with the human therefore existing in a line of pure continuity with all other organic forms of life. A mutation had thereby occurred, in that Darwin, by means of his deconstruction of the Chain of Being that had been earlier mapped onto the rational human/irrational animals line, had begun the emancipation of the human knowledge of the purely biological level of reality from having to be known in genre-specific adaptive terms, thereby giving rise to the biological sciences and to its contemporary, dazzling triumphs—as, for example, the cracking of the DNA code, the Human Genome Project, together with the utopian cum dystopian promises and possibilities of biotechnology.

It can be seen in hindsight that the “space of Otherness” which had been projected both upon the heavens as well as upon organic life, had been a central function of the Godelier-type mechanisms by means of which, as
humans, we keep our own authorship and agency opaque to ourselves, in that the respective codes that had been mapped upon them (i.e., that of Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh, then that of rational nature [redeemed from irrationality] and irrational nature [enslaved to irrationality]) had both played a central analogical status-ordering and thereby system-maintaining role for their respective social systems: firstly, that of Latin-Christian Europe, followed by that of the monarchical (whether absolute or constitutionally limited) order of the landed-gentry West. Analogical in the sense that it was their “space of Otherness” projection that had induced the subjects of both of these orders to both know and experience their societies’ respective role allocation, social hierarchies, divisions of labor, and ratio-proportional distribution of their goods and their bads as being supernaturally preordained—as, in their respective ethno-knowledges, both the projected difference of ontological substance between heaven and earth (Spirit/Flesh) in the first case, and in the second, that between rational humans and irrational animals, had been divinely created to be. With the status-ordering principles generated from their respective codes—one based on ostensibly differential degrees of enslavement to sin/redemption from sin, the other on ostensibly differential degrees of rational nature/enslavement to irrational nature—thereby inducing the subjects of these orders to experience their own placement in the structuring hierarchies of the order as having been extrahumanly (in these two cases supernaturally) designed and/or determined, rather than as veridically or systemically produced by our collective human agency.

The Argument proposes that the new master code of the bourgeoisie and of its ethnoclass conception of the human—that is, the code of selected by Evolution/dysselected by Evolution—was now to be mapped and anchored on the only available “objective set of facts” that remained. This was the set of environmentally, climatically determined phenotypical differences between human hereditary variations as these had developed in the wake of the human diaspora both across and out of the continent of Africa; that is, as a set of (so to speak) totemic differences, which were now harnessed to the task of projecting the Color Line drawn institutionally and discursively between whites/nonwhites—and at its most extreme between
the Caucasoid physiognomy (as symbolic life, the name of what is good, the idea that some humans can be selected by Evolution) and the Negroid physiognomy (as symbolic death, the “name of what is evil,” the idea that some humans can be dysselected by Evolution)—as the new extrahuman line, or projection of genetic nonhomogeneity that would now be made to function, analogically, as the status-ordering principle based upon ostensibly differential degrees of evolutionary selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselectedness/dysgenicity. Differential degrees, as between the classes (middle and lower and, by extrapolation, between capital and labor) as well as between men and women, and between the heterosexual and homosexual erotic preference—and, even more centrally, as between Breadwinner (job-holding middle and working classes) and the jobless and criminalized Poor, with this rearticulated at the global level as between Sartre’s “Men” and Natives (see his guide-quote), before the end of politico-military colonialism, then postcolonially as between the “developed” First World, on the one hand, and the “underdeveloped” Third and Fourth Worlds on the other. The Color Line was now projected as the new “space of Otherness” principle of nonhomogeneity, made to reoccupy the earlier places of the motion-filled heavens/non-moving Earth, rational humans/irrational animal lines, and to recode in new terms their ostensible extrahumanly determined differences of ontological substance. While, if the earlier two had been indispensable to the production and reproduction of their respective genres of being human, of their descriptive statements (i.e., as Christian and as Man1), and of the overall order in whose field of interrelationships, social hierarchies, system of role allocations, and divisions of labors each such genre of the human could alone realize itself—and with each such descriptive statement therefore being rigorously conserved by the “learning system” and order of knowledge as articulated in the institutional structure of each order—this was to be no less the case with respect to the projected “space of Otherness” of the Color Line. With respect, that is, to its indispensability to the production and reproduction of our present genre of the human Man2, together with the overall global/national bourgeois order of things and its specific mode of economic production, alone able to provide the material conditions of existence for the production and reproduction of the
ethnoclass or Western-bourgeois answer that we now give to the question of the who and what we are.

It is in this context that the Negro, the Native, the Colonial Questions, and postcolonially the “Underdeveloped” or Third/Fourth-Worlds Question can be clearly seen to be the issue, not of our present mode of economic production, but rather of the ongoing production and reproduction of this answer—that is, our present biocentric ethnoclass genre of the human, of which our present techno-industrial, capitalist mode of production is an indispensable and irreplaceable, but only a proximate function. With this genre of the human being one in the terms of whose dually biogenetic and economic notions of freedom both the peoples of African hereditary descent and the peoples who comprise the damned archipelagoes of the Poor, the jobless the homeless, the “underdeveloped” must lawlikely be sacrificed as a function of our continuing to project our collective authorship of our contemporary order onto the imagined agency of Evolution and Natural Selection and, by extrapolation, onto the “Invisible Hand” of the “Free Market” (both being cultural and class-specific constructs).

The challenge to be confronted at this conjuncture is this: While from the Renaissance onwards, Western intellectuals have, by means of the development of the natural sciences, enabled us to obtain nonadaptive knowledge of our nonhuman levels of reality, we have hitherto had no such parallel knowledge with respect to ourselves and the nature-culture laws that govern our modes of being, of behaving, of mind, or of minding. The buck for such knowledge (one able to open up a new frontier of nonadaptive human self-cognition, and therefore the possibility of our nonheteronomously and now consciously ordered/motivated behaviors, beyond the ethnoclass limits of our contemporary ones) stops with us. While the prescriptive guidelines of how we are to set about this challenge lie in the paradox of the new Darwinian descriptive statement of the human: Man in its second, purely secular, biocentric, and overrepresented modality of being human. What then had been the contradiction at the heart of the Darwinian Revolution, at the core of its paradigm of Evolution that was to give rise to, on the one hand, the continuing dazzling successes of the biological sciences and, on the other, not only to the obsessive ethno-biological beliefs in the genetic
inferiority of nonwhite natives, in the barely evolved near-primate status of black-skinned peoples (as matrix beliefs that would logically make possible the “life unworthy of life” extermination credo of the Nazis), but also at the same time to C. P. Snow’s “Two Cultures” division of knowledge? That is, to the natural-scientific disciplines on the one hand, and to the rigorous yet adaptive, and therefore ethno-disciplines of the humanities and social sciences on the other?

Although Foucault, in his analysis of the processes by means of which the classical episteme was replaced by our own, had proposed that these epistememes be seen as being discontinuous with each other, what he oversaw was that such a discontinuity, like the earlier discontinuity that had been effected by the classical episteme itself, was taking place in the terms of a continuous cultural field, one instituted by the matrix Judeo-Christian formulation of a general order of existence. That, therefore, these shifts in epistememes were not only shifts with respect to each episteme’s specific order of knowledge/truth, but were also shifts in what can now be identified as the “politics of being”; that is, as a politics that is everywhere fought over what is to be the descriptive statement, the governing sociogenic principle, instituting of each genre of the human. With the result that as Christian becomes Man1 (as political subject), then as Man1 becomes Man2 (as a bio-economic subject), from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, each of these new descriptive statements will nevertheless remain inscribed within the framework of a specific secularizing reformulation of that matrix Judeo-Christian Grand Narrative. With this coming to mean that, in both cases, their epistememes will be, like their respective genres of being human, both discontinuous and continuous.

This was the fact that Jacob Pandian brought to our attention when he noted that the Untrue Christian Self as the Other to the True Christian Self of the Judeo-Christian conception was to be re-inscripted, from the sixteenth century onwards, as the new Untrue Human Others to the “true” human that is Man, in its two forms. Firstly as subrational Indian, Negro Others to Man1, then, secondly, as native and nigger Others to Man2. It is with this proposal that he also provides the answer to the why of the imperative signifying role that will continue to be placed by the secular West upon
what seems to its subjects, from the perspective of their somatic norm, to be
the alien features of the Negroid physiognomy. The answer also as to the why
the negative connotations that will continue to be placed on it should, while
now effected in purely biologized terms, still carry over, if in new post-six-
ties terms, the “undeserving” “name of what is evil” ordering principle that
still reenacts the matrix stigma that had been placed by medieval
Christianity on the Negroid physiognomy (Gans 1999). With the conse-
quence that because now made to embody and actualize the example of the
human, not now as fallen to the status of the ape, but rather as barely evolved
from it (and, as such, an undeserving race because dysselected-by-Evolution
within the logic of the Darwinian paradigm), it was now not only the peo-
bles of the Black ex-slave Diaspora, but all the peoples of Black Africa who
would be also compelled to confront the inescapable fact (one attested to by
the infamous 41-bullet shooting death of Amadou Diallo) that, as put suc-
cinctly by Frantz Fanon, “wherever he[/she] goes in the world, the Negro
remains a Negro” (Fanon 1967)—and, as such, made to reoccupy the signi-
fying place of medieval/Latin-Christian Europe’s fallen, degraded, and
thereby nonmoving Earth.

The Argument here redefines Marx’s class struggle in the terms of a “pol-
itics of being”: that is, one waged over what is to be the descriptive state-
ment of the human, about whose master code of symbolic life and death
each human order organizes itself. It then proposes that it was precisely
because of the above political dynamic—which underpinned the Darwinian
Revolution, making it possible—that it was also compelled to function as a
half-scientific, half-mythic theory of origins, at least as it had to do with the
human. Since it was to be in the context of the political struggle for hege-
mony that was being waged by a then increasingly wealthy but non-landed
bourgeoisie against the established ruling elite of the landed gentry elite that
Darwin would be impelled to put forward a new theory with respect to the
origin of all species, including the human species (one able to move outside
the terms of the “Argument from Divine Design”), that had functioned to
legitimate both the ruling status of the landed gentry and the order of knowl-
dge of the classical episteme, and that had provided the mode of adaptive
truth-for indispensable to the legitimation of the ruling gentry’s hegemony.
It was in order to deconstruct the “Argument from Divine Design” that Darwin was to put forward his brilliantly innovative new paradigm that would lead to the rise and development of the biological sciences, at the same time as it would also elaborate a new origin narrative in place of Genesis (Isaacs 1983).

Blumenberg reveals the central role that will be played in this reformulation by the clergyman-economist Thomas Malthus (Blumenberg 1983). This is the new form of the “absence of order” that Malthus will elaborate in his 1798 Essay on the Principle of Population. For Malthus, it is the “autonomous lawfulness of population growth,” projected as a “universal law of life,” which predetermines a new modality of the “absence of order”: this time, the ostensibly fundamental contradiction posed by the fact that men's increase in numbers is a geometric progression, whereas the increase in the quantity of food can only be an arithmetical progression. With the result that given the widening gap between the two progressions, the law of self-regulation that follows logically calls for the state's noninterference with the ostensibly extrahuman regulatory effect of the supposed “law of nature”—a law that also calls for the category of the Poor to be left by themselves, unaidered by any measures taken by the state, in order that its members can be weeded out by the “iron laws” of nature. What Malthus puts in place, therefore, is the second transumed reformulation of the matrix Judeo-Christian formulation. Enslavement here is no longer to Original Sin, or to one's irrational nature—with, in the case of the latter, the threat or “significant ill” of the political state falling into the chaos and nonpredictability of a state-of-nature. Rather, enslavement is now to the threat of Malthusian overpopulation, to its concomitant “ill” of Natural Scarcity whose imperative “plan of salvation” would now be postulated in economic terms as that of keeping this at bay—of material, in the place of the matrix spiritual, Redemption.

The above reformulations were all part of the then intellectuals’ struggle to redescribe both the human, and its human activity, outside the terms of the description of the human on whose basis the owners of landed wealth had based their hegemony. What is usually overlooked, however, is that their redescription will be one that carried in its turn a new descriptive statement
able to legitimate the rise to hegemony of the non-landed, capital-owning bourgeoisie as the new ruling elite. While it will be in the lineaments of the new criteria defining of Man2, in the terms of this new descriptive statement, that the lineaments of its negative Human Others are also already outlined. Seeing that if at one level Man2 is now defined as a jobholding Breadwinner, and even more optimally, as a successful “masterer of Natural Scarcity” (Investor, or capital accumulator), what might be called the archipelago of its modes of Human Otherness can no longer be defined in the terms of the interned Mad, the interned “Indian,” the enslaved “Negro” in which it had been earlier defined. Instead, the new descriptive statement of the human will call for its archipelago of Human Otherness to be peopled by a new category, one now comprised of the jobless, the homeless, the Poor, the systemically made jobless and criminalized—of the “underdeveloped”—all as the category of the economically damnés (Fanon 1963), rather than, as before, of the politically condemned. With the result that if inside Europe, it will be the Poor who will be made to reoccupy the earlier proscribed interned places of the Leper and the Mad, in the Euro-Americas, it is the freed Negro, together with the Indians interned in reservations, or as peons on haciendas, who will now be interned in the new institution of Poverty/Joblessness.

That is, in an institution now made to actualize the idea of the human overcome by Natural Scarcity, and therefore in the process of being swept away by Malthus’s “iron laws of nature,” because unable, as the regular jobholding Breadwinners and Investors are so clearly able to do, to master the “ill” of this scarcity. This at the same time, as Fanon shows in The Wretched of the Earth, as the “native” rural agro-proletariat interned in colonial institutions would be made to actualize the category most totally condemned to poverty and joblessness, ostensibly because of the represented bio-evolutionarily determined incapacity of its members to do otherwise. Since, like the medieval Leper, whose proscribed role had called for him/her to actualize the realization of the effects of mankind’s enslavement to Original Sin, so this new archipelago of Otherness will be made to signify the realization of the new reformulation’s posited “absence of order,” or postulate of “significant ill,” defined now in economic terms. And “curable,” therefore, only in economic terms.
What can be seen as at work here is the positive aspect of the political project that, however nonconsciously so, drove Darwin's intellectual enterprise. In that it is going to be in the wider context of the intellectual revolution of Liberal or economic (rather than civic) political humanism that is being brought in from the end of the eighteenth century onwards by the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, together with their redefinition of Man1 in the purely secular and now biocentric terms of Man2 that these new sciences are going to be made possible. Since the new genre of being human, in its now purely degodded conception, is one that no longer needs to know the world of organic life in the ostensibly supernaturally ordered, adaptive truth-for terms in which it had to be known by the subject-bearers of Man1—as it had been known, therefore, in the terms of Foucault's classical episteme, with these terms serving to validate the hegemony of the owners of landed rather than of moveable wealth, or capital. Yet it is also in the terms of this specific political project that the fundamental paradox of the Darwinian Revolution emerges, one that links the imperatively secured bottom role of the Black Diaspora peoples—as well as the systemic expendability of the global Poor, of the jobless, the homeless, the underdeveloped—to the issue raised earlier with respect to the imperative “Two Culture” organization of our present order of knowledge.

To sum up: it is in this context that a new principle of nonhomogeneity, that of DuBois's Color Line in its white/nonwhite, Men/Natives form (i.e., as drawn between the lighter and the darker races), will now be discursively and institutionally deployed as a “space of Otherness” on which to project an imagined and extrahumanly (because ostensibly bio-evolutionarily) determined nonhomogeneity of genetic substance between the category of those selected-by-Evolution and the category of those dysselected-by-Evolution. The Color (cum Colonial) Line would, therefore, be made to reoccupy the places earlier occupied by the Heaven/Earth, supralunar/sublunar, and by the rational humans/irrational animals premises of nonhomogeneity in order to enable the selected/dysselected, and thus deserving/undeserving status organizing principle that it encoded to function for the nation-state as well as the imperial orders of the Western bourgeoisie, in the same way as Jacques Le Goff documents the enslaved to the flesh/Redeemed-in-the-
Spirit, deserving/undeserving status-organizing principle had functioned for the ecclesiastical-cum-medieval aristocratic order of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1988). So that where the ranking rule of superiority/inferiority accepted and internalized by all the subjects of the medieval order of Europe had been that of differential degrees of redemption from enslavement to the Fallen Flesh, degrees therefore of religious merit (with the “learned” scholars of the order, as Le Goff points out, obsessively priding themselves on their ability to keep themselves chaste and sexually continent on feast days, at the same time as they stigmatized the peasants as people who, unlike them, gave in to their lustful and carnal desires, thereby falling to the level of beasts [Le Goff 1988]), in the case of the bourgeoisie, the ranking rule would be a transumed form of the first. As such, therefore, it would come to be based on degrees of selected genetic merit (or eugenics) versus differential degrees of the dysselected lack of this merit: differential degrees of, to use the term made famous by The Bell Curve, “dysgenicity.”

It is this new master code, one that would now come to function at all levels of the social order—including that of class, gender, sexual orientation, superior/inferior ethnicities, and that of the Investor/Breadwinners versus the criminalized jobless Poor (Nas’s “black and latino faces”) and Welfare Moms antithesis, and most totally between the represented-to-be superior and inferior races and cultures—that would come to function as the dually status-organizing and integrating principle of U.S. society. So that if, before the sixties, the enforced segregation of the Black population in the South as the liminally deviant category of Otherness through whose systemic negation the former Civil War enemies of North and South, together with the vast wave of incoming immigrants from Europe, would be enabled to experience themselves as a We (that is, by means of the shared similarity of their now-canonized “whiteness”), in addition, their segregated status had served another central function. This had been that of enabling a U.S. bourgeoisie, rapidly growing more affluent, to dampen class conflict by inducing their own working class to see themselves, even where not selected by Evolution in class terms, as being compensatorily, altruistically bonded with their dominant middle classes by the fact of their having all been selected by Evolution in terms of race.
For this vicarious compensation had been (and still is) urgently necessary, given the degree of psychic devastation wrought on the non-middle-class groups by the terms of the new degodded redescription of the human in the context of the Darwinian/Malthusian reformulation of the original Judeo-Christian formulation. This was so in that in the terms of their new behavior programming schema, in whose “dysselected by Evolution until proven otherwise” criterion (i.e., guilty until proven innocent) the individual could not know if s/he had indeed been so selected except by attaining to the optimal status of being a middle class Breadwinner and/or successful Entrepreneur/Investor, to not be middle class was/is to have to accept one’s ostensible dysselection. This premise had induced in the white, blue-collar (non-middle) working classes’ status a deeply destructive form of self-hatred, whose corrosive force could only be assuaged by institutionalized mechanisms, whether those of the school curricula as noted by Carter G. Woodson in 1933, or that of outright segregation of (as well as of multiple other forms of discrimination against) the Black U. S. population group. Seeing that it was and is only such mechanisms that can enable the white, blue-collar working classes, as well as the white poor, to experience themselves as having been selected, although not in class terms, at least as members, together with their bourgeoisie, of the highly selected and thus highly “deserving” white race. With this being so proved, ostensibly, by the fact of the empirical dominance and supremacy of whites as a group over all other nonwhite races and, most totally, over their “racial” anti-type Other, the Black American—as the group whose Negroid physiognomy and origin continent/Africa prove them, within the terms of the Darwinian Imaginary, to belong to the category of humans most totally of all peoples dysselected-by-Evolution. The bottommost role of Black Americans in the United States is systemically produced, since it is the ostensible proof of their alleged dysselected “undeservingness” that then functions as the central psychic compensatory mechanism for the white working class, at the same time as this mechanism induces them to continue to see/experience themselves as also being, in terms of class, “dysselected by Evolution”—a perception that induces them to accept their own class-subordinated status, as well as the hegemony of their middle classes.
The Negroid physiognomy and its continent of origin, Black Africa, together with the dark-skinned poorer peoples assimilated to its category have been made to function within the terms of our present biocentric conception of the human, as well as of its related “formulation of a general order of existence” (whose postulate of “significant ill” is that of a dual mode of Natural Scarcity—that is, a scarcity of fully genetically selected human beings, on the one hand, and of material resources on the other), as the actualized embodiment, no longer of the human made degenerate by sin and therefore fallen to the status of the apes, but of the human totally dysselected, barely evolved, and as such intermediate between “true” humans and the primates. As such, the marker of that most totally dysselected-by-Evolution mode of non-being that each individual and group must strive to avoid, struggle to prove that they themselves are not, if they are to be.

A parallel and interlinked role is also played by the category of the Poor, the jobless, the homeless, the “underdeveloped,” all of whom, interned in their systemically produced poverty and expendability, are now made to function in the reoccupied place of the Leper of the medieval order and of the Mad of the monarchical, so as to actualize at the economic level the same dysgenic or dysselected-by-Evolution conception. With the post-Sixties’ reordering of society, “Negroid” physiognomy and skin color will be made to coalesce with the inner city status of poverty and joblessness, crime, and drugs. They will do so together with those brown Latino faces assimilated to its status as this status, a new Liminal category, enables the incorporation of the socially mobile Black middle class into the normative order of things, if still at a secondary level. The metaphysical dread of this “Negroid” presence by the “normal” subjects of the order will lead logically to Nas Escobar’s “taxpayers” being eager to pay for more jails for Black and Latin faces; eager to see poor women taken off welfare and kept “out of plain sight.” Since here, again, it is not as men, women, and children that they are being condemned. It is as “the name of what is evil.”

Here, the dimensions of the fundamental paradox that lies at the core of the Darwinian answer to the question of who we are (when seen from the perspective of the goal of unsettling our present coloniality of power, of being) emerges. The paradox is this: that for the “descriptive statement” that
defines the human as purely biological being on the model of a natural organism (thereby projecting it as preexisting the narratively inscribed “descriptive statement” in whose terms it inscripts itself and is reciprocally inscribed, as if it were a purely biological being, ontogeny that preexists culture, sociogeny), it must ensure the functioning of strategic mechanisms that can repress all knowledge of the fact that its biocentric descriptive statement is a descriptive statement. Yet that such strategic, Godelier-type mechanisms of occultation, repressing recognition that our present descriptive statement of the human is a descriptive statement, are able to function at all (if outside our conscious awareness) is itself directly due to the fact that, as Terrence W. Deacon points out in his 1997 book *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*, humans have been pre-adapted, primarily through the co-evolution of language and the brain, to be a symbolic and, therefore, a self-representing species.

In consequence, if it was the functioning of these symbolic, representational, behavior-motivating/demotivating processes as it has to do with the stigmatizing portrayal of women as intellectually inferior, made by “angry male professors,” that Virginia Woolf had brilliantly zeroed in on (in her essay *A Room of One’s Own*), it was also this same “representational process,” as expressed in the curriculum and order of knowledge of the United States, that the Black American educator Carter G. Woodson was to identify in his 1933 *Miseducation of the Negro* as functioning in a parallel manner as a behavior-motivating/demotivating mechanism. This, seeing that, as he pointed out, the curriculum’s systemic canonization/positive marking of all things European and Euro-American, and no less systemic stigmatization/negative marking of all things African/Afro-American clearly had an extracognitive function. This function was one that, by motivating whites (by representing their ancestors as having done everything worthwhile doing), and as lawlikely demotivating Blacks (by representing theirs as having done nothing), ensured the stable reproduction of the U.S. order that called for the white population group as a whole to be at the apex of the social order, and for the Black population group to be at the bottom (Woodson 1933). With this thereby “verifying,” by its systemic production of the constant of the 15 percent school achievement gap between white and
Black students, the selected-by-Evolution status of the one, the dysselected-by-Evolution nature of the other, and thereby the principle of nonhomo-
genre that is mapped upon the “space of Otherness” of the Color Line in its
most total white/Black forms. As the line from which the status-ordering
principle, based upon differential degrees of selectedness/dysselectedness
and functioning at all levels of the order, is transformatively generated,
thereby enabling the subjects of our orders to continue to experience it as
the realization of a true, because ostensibly extrahumanly determined, order.

If we see both Woolf's and Woodson's insights as insights into the work-
ings of the symbolic representation processes instituting of our present
geno of the human, Man, and therefore as insights into the necessarily
adaptive truth-for nature of the overall system of knowledge that is enacting
of these processes, then the following linkages can be made. Linkages not
only to Aimé Césaire's recognition of the same “demotivating” processes at
work in ensuring the subordination of the decolonized in his Discourse on
Colonialism (1960), but also to the multiple challenges mounted during the
sixties—both at the global level by anticolonial activists and by activists in
Europe, and then in the United States by Blacks and a range of other non-
white groups, together with feminists and Gay Liberationists—with all call-
ing in question the systemic nature of their negative markings as nongeneric
or abnormal Others to a series of positively marked generic norms. If this
same overall representation process was to be followed up post-sixties by
Edward Said's more in-depth elaboration of Césaire's thesis with respect to
Orientalism, the same linkage can also be made several centuries backward
to Las Casas's profound challenges to what he called the “slandering” of the
indigenous peoples as a function of the legitimating not only of the expro-
priation of their lands, but also of their expulsion, as “such a large part of
God’s creation,” from human status. Since what joins all of these challenges,
from that of Las Casas to all those of our contemporary order, is, the
Argument proposes, their profound challenge to the overrepresentation of
Man, in both of its variants: to, thereby, the coloniality of being, power, truth,
freedom to which such an overrepresentation leads.

If Fanon, from the standpoint of a “native colonized” and Black Human
Other (i.e., as the standpoint of groups, prohibited—most totally so the lat-
ter—from realizing themselves as fully human within the terms of our present ethnoclass genre of the human), was to put forward the conception of modes of sociogeny (of each genre-specific governing sociogenic principle, descriptive statement, or code of symbolic life/death) as a new object of knowledge, which itself functions in a “space of transculture,” as a space from which to define the human outside the terms of any one member of the class of such principles, statements and codes, he had thereby laid the basis for a fundamental recognition on our part. A recognition in which we can come to see ourselves as a contemporary, increasingly westernized (in the terms of Man) population, who, as in the case of all other genre-specific human populations, inscript and auto-institute ourselves as human through symbolic, representational processes that have, hitherto, included those mechanisms of occultation by means of which we have been able to make opaque to ourselves the fact that we so do. While it was a parallel recognition that some half a century ago led Aimé Césaire (because coming from the same standpoint of liminal deviance to our present ethnoclass norm of being human as did Fanon) to put forward his cognitively emancipatory proposal for a new science able to complete the natural sciences.

The natural sciences (Césaire had argued in a talk given in Haiti, entitled “Poetry and Knowledge”) are, in spite of all their dazzling triumphs with respect to knowledge of the natural world, half-starved. They are half-starved because they remain incapable of giving us any knowledge of our uniquely human domain, and have had nothing to say to the urgent problems that beleaguer humankind. Only the elaboration of a new science, beyond the limits of the natural sciences (he had then proposed), will offer us our last chance to avoid the large-scale dilemmas that we must now confront as a species. This would be a science in which the “study of the Word” — of our narratively inscribed, governing sociogenic principles, descriptive statement, or code of symbolic life/death, together with the overall symbolic, representational processes to which they give rise — will condition the “study of nature” (Césaire 1946, 1990). The latter as study, therefore (the Argument proposes), of the neurophysiological circuits/mechanisms of the brain that, when activated by the semantic system of each such principle/statement, lead to the specific orders of consciousness or modes of mind in whose
terms we then come to experience ourselves as this or that genre/mode of being human. Yet, with this process taking place hitherto outside our conscious awareness, and thereby leading us to be governed by the “imagined ends” or postulates of being, truth, freedom that we lawlikely put and keep in place, without realizing that it is we ourselves, and not extrahuman entities, who prescribe them.

In his introduction to Fanon’s *Les damnés de la terre* (The Wretched of the Earth), J. P. Sartre zeroed in on the parallel dilemma of “colonized” native intellectuals who find themselves/ourselves in a situation in which the Man/Native dichotomy can be seen as an exact parallel of the clergy/laity dichotomy as it existed towards the end of the Middle Ages. Like the clergy intellectuals then, now it is the intellectuals of Man who “own the Word,” while, like the pre-Renaissance lay intellectuals, it is the “native” intellectuals (and postcolonially speaking, the intellectuals of the subordinated and economically impoverished world) who now have only the use of Man’s Word, who therefore can only “echo.” That is, who must think, write, and prescribe policies, however oppositionally so, in the terms of the very biocentric paradigms that prescribe the subordination and impoverishment of the vast majority of the worlds to which they/we belong; since paradigms elaborated in the very terms of the descriptive statement of the human, in whose logic the non-Western, nonwhite peoples can only, at best, be assimilated as honorary humans (as in the case of the “developed” Japanese and other lighter-skinned Asians) and, at the worst, must (as in the case of Nas’s “black and Latino faces”) forcibly be proscribed from human status by means of the rapidly expanding U.S. prison-industrial system; as itself, a central mechanism of the overall archipelagoes of the poverty-producing institutions of the Third and Fourth Worlds, archipelagoes that are the major costs paid for the ongoing production, realization, and reproduction of our present ethnolclass genre of the human, of its overrepresentation as if it were isomorphic with the human, its well being, and notion of freedom, with those that would have to be brought into existence, were the well-being of the human to be made into the referent imperative.

If, as Sartre saw so clearly in the case of Fanon, “native” intellectuals had ceased echoing and had begun opening their mouths for themselves in
response to a parallel “phase of objectification,” a hardening insulation from what is human that is increasingly made evident by the ossification of our present order of knowledge and its biocentric paradigms, so Fanon’s “self-assertion,” his concentration on finding the lost motives, related no longer to Man’s but to our human self-interest, was to be effected by means of a redescription parallel to that by means of which the lay humanists had invented Man and its Human Others in the reoccupied place of the Christian genre of the human and its pagan/idolator/Enemies-of-Christ/Christ-killer/infidel Others. Nevertheless, while these lay humanist intellectuals had indeed effected a redescriptive statement by means of which they secularized human existence, detaching it from the supernatural agency of the divine realm, they had done so only by opening the pathway that would eventually lead, with Darwin, to a new descriptive statement, itself re-anchored in the no less extrahuman agency of Evolution, thereby reducing the human within the terms of a biocentric “human sciences” paradigm to being a “mere mechanism” driven in its behavior by its genetic programs—and, as such, subject to the processes of natural causation, rather than to the ontogeny/sociogeny or nature-culture modality of causation, which alone could enable (as Fanon brilliantly glimpsed) the reflexively self-aversive behavior of many westernized Black peoples, made into the Other to our present ethnoclass norm of being human, to repress the genetic instinctual narcissism defining of all modes of purely organic life. And what Fanon’s new answer to the question of who/what we are (its revalorizing “descriptive statement” detached now from any form of extrahuman agency or authorship, theocentric or biocentric) enables us to come to grips with is precisely such a new mode of causation, thereby, with the still-to-be-explained puzzle of (human) consciousness(es), doing so outside the terms of our present “Two Culture” order of knowledge and its adaptive “regime of truth” based on the biocentric disciplinary paradigms in whose terms we at present know our social reality; this, as the indispensable condition of our continuing to assume that the mode of being in which we now are (have socialized/inscripted ourselves to be) is isomorphic with the being of being human itself, in its multiple self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities.
If Césaire called in 1946 for a new science of the Word, a science therefore of our dual descriptive statements and thereby of our modes/genres of being human, doing so from the perspective of a poet—in 1988, the physicist Hans Pagel would make a parallel call in his 1988 book *The Dream of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity*. His call, too, was for a new frontier to be opened onto a nonadaptive mode of human self-cognition: onto the possibility, therefore, of our fully realized autonomy of feelings, thoughts, behaviors.

The true leap, Fanon wrote at the end of his *Black Skins, White Masks*, consists in introducing invention into existence. The buck stops with us.

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**Notes**

1. The epigraphs placed at the beginning of select sections are intended to serve as guidequotes, or as Heideggerian guideposts (Heidegger 1998), to orient the reader as the Argument struggles to think/articulate itself outside the terms of the disciplinary discourses of our present epistemological order; seeing that it is these discourses, this order, that are necessarily—as the condition of our being in the genre/mode of being human that we now hegemonically are—instituting/inscripting both of the Man of the Argument’s title, and of its overrepresentation as if it were the human.

2. The series of papers presented/made available by Aníbal Quijano at the 1999 and 2000 conferences held by the Coloniality Working Group at SUNY-Binghamton are central to the formulations of this Argument (see References).

3. The same holds for the two papers presented by Walter Mignolo at both of these conferences (see References), as well as for his book *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (2000).

4. The divide is not only economic, but also behavioral. Where the subjects of the techno-industrial North are hegemonically oriented in their behaviors by the contemporary secular metaphysics of productivity and profitability, the subjects of the South, while drawn into the margins as satellite spheres of the techno-industrial North, are still partly oriented in their behaviors by the largely religious, traditional metaphysics of reproductivity/fertility that had been instituting of the agrarian revolution. The problem of the environment, of global warming, etc., is directly due to the convergence of these two metaphysics and the way in which both continue to impel our collective behaviors outside of our conscious awareness.
5. Cited by Frantz Fanon as epigraph to his *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* (Black Skins, White Masks) 1967.
6. Las Casas's reply to Ginés de Sepúlveda on the occasion of the 1660–61 debate at Valladolid, Spain, as to whether or not the New World Indians were equally "men" (Las Casas) or "slaves-by-nature" (Sepúlveda).
7. The Cenú Indians' reply to the Spaniards' "local culture" conception of the legitimacy of the Papal Bull of 1492 as one that "gave" the New World to Spain, as cited by Greenblatt (1974).
8. In his presentation to the 2000 Conference of the Coloniality Working Group, now included in this volume, Kelvin Santiago-Valles documented these socio-existential, political, and commercial-economic processes, even where he represents the latter as the determinant forces driving the transformation (see References), as distinct from Kurt Hubner's concept of an interacting overall system-ensemble transformation (Hubner 1983), the key to which, the Argument proposes, is the redescription of the descriptive statement of the public operational identity of Christian as that of Man overrepresented as the generic human; the redescription also, therefore, of the Christian Others—i.e., pagan-idolators, infidels, Enemies-of-Christ, as Human Others (i.e., Indians, Negroes).
9. As Quijano perceptively sees, the contemporary focus on Orientalism that deals with the stigmatization of Islam, as an alternative imperial monotheistic order to that of the West, has completely and strategically displaced the far more totally exclusionary system of stigmatization placed upon Indians and Negroes (see his Qué tal Raza!).
10. Peter Carlo raises this issue—that of the role of discursive formations in the ongoing processes of accumulation by which the "proletariats" are produced as rightless and landless—in his presentation at the 1999 Conference of the Coloniality Working Group (see References).

REFERENCES


